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SHIELDING CHILDREN FROM VIOLENT VIDEO GAMES 
THROUGH RATINGS OFFENDER LISTS 
KEVIN W. SAUNDERS· 
INTRODUCTION 
The past decade has seen a great deal of concern over the exposure of 
children to violent video games. Social scientists have provided a basis for that 
concern through studies linking the playing of such games to real world 
aggression, I but the links have not been sufficiently strong for the courts to accept 
legal limitations on access by children.2 In each case, legislative limitations have 
been opposed by the video game industry, even though the industry's own ratings 
system considers many of the violent games unsuitable for children.3 The 
purpose of this Article is not to suggest the abandonment of the legislative 
attempts at limiting access. The analysis of the courts rejecting the previous 
attempts has focused on the purported failure of the science to support the 
necessity of the restrictions to meet the accepted compelling interest in the 
physical and psychological well-being of youth.4 That analysis is time bound. 
That is, all a court could say is that the science, as it existed at the time of the 
court's examination of the issue, failed to support adequately the limitations. 
That conclusion says nothing with regard to the science even six months or a year 
in the future, and each time a legislature tries to limit the access of children to 
violent video games, courts must examine the science anew. The continued 
development of social science, and the new insights being provided by 
neuroscience,5 make the possibility that courts will recognize the necessity of 
these limits at some point in the future very real. 
What is suggested here is that, at least as a temporary means of protecting 
children, parents be provided with notice as to which stores and arcades are 
allowing access to games that are inappropriate for their children, according to 
the video game industry's own ratings systems. There is evidence that media 
ratings systems may be confusing or misleading,6 so parents may not recognize 
which games have been rated as inappropriate. There may also be confusion as 
to the legal status of the industry ratings systems. If parents believe that their 
children are not allowed to buy games or play games in arcades rated beyond the 
* Professor Law, Michigan State University College of Law. A.B., Franklin & Marshall 
College; M.S., M.A., Ph.D., University of Miami; J.D., University of Michigan. 
1. See infra notes IS-55 and accompanying text. The cited material also shows that the 
courts have not been receptive to the social science. 
2. See infra notes 19, 27, 43-55 and accompanying text. But see notes 26, 31 and 
accompanying text. 
3. See infra notes 92-117 and accompanying text. 
4. See infra notes IS-55 and accompanying text. 
5. For a discussion of the relevant neuroscience, see Kevin W. Saunders, A Disconnect 
Between Law and Neuroscience: Modem Brain Science, Media Influences, and Juvenile Justice, 
2005 UTAH L. REv. 695. 
6. See infra notes 1OS-14 and accompanying text. 
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ages of their children,7 they may not realize what their children experience in 
arcades or buy in stores. 
The confusion over what is available to children could be cleared up by 
attempts by either public interest groups or governmental units to have children 
purchase, or play in arcades, games rated as beyond their age. Where the attempt 
is successful, the name of the store selling the game or the mall or other place in 
which the arcade is located could be placed on a web site, using the model of sex 
offender web sites. Parents could then know the stores at which they may safely 
let their children shop and the malls at which their children may similarly "hang 
out." The video game industry and retailers will likely be unhappy with the effort 
and will certainly see it as the back door effort to limit children's access. Where 
the web site is compiled and accurately maintained by a private entity, there 
would be little recourse for the industry. However, where the effort is undertaken 
by a governmental entity, there is certain to be a First Amendment challenge, 
although it is a challenge that should prove to be unsuccessful. 
This Article begins by examining briefly the failed efforts at shielding 
children from violent video games.8 Part II examines the video game ratings 
system,9 presents past "sting" operations,1O and proposes such future operations. II 
Once the proposal is laid out, Part ill examines the potential First Amendment 
and other constitutional challenges. The Article concludes with an examination 
of the potential content of the proposed web site and a discussion of "ratings 
creep."12 
I. THE CASE LAW ON VIOLENT VIDEO GAME RESTRICTIONS 
There has been a growing number of cases decided in this decade striking 
down limitations on children's access to violent video games. The fIrst arose in 
2000, when the combined city and county councils for the City of Indianapolis 
and Marion County, Indiana, passed an ordinance requiring that video arcades 
separate their sexually explicit and violent games from their more innocuous fare 
and not allow those under eighteen to play those games, unless accompanied by 
a parent, guardian, or custodian. 13 When the video game industry challenged the 
ordinance in federal district court, the court refused to enjoin its enforcement. 14 
7. The Author has identified no studies on this issue, but is regularly asked why the video 
game industry is not subject to the same restrictions as the film industry. There is clearly a belief 
that the film industry ratings have a legal force that does not in fact exist for that similarly voluntary 
video game system. 
8. See infra Part I. 
9. See infra Part II.A. 
10. See infra Part II.B. 
11. See infra Part II.C. 
12. See infra notes 133-341 and accompanying text. 
13. The ordinance is discussed in American Amusement Machine Ass'n v. Kendrick, 115 F. 
Supp. 2d 943, 946-48 (S.D. Ind. 2000), rev'd, 244 F.3d 572 (7th Cir. 2001). 
14. [d. at 981. 
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The court relied primarily on the variable obscenity doctrine found, as applied to 
youth, in Ginsberg v. New York,15 stating that "the court is not persuaded there is 
any principled constitutional difference between sexually explicit material and 
graphic violence, at least when it comes to providing such material to children.,,16 
The court, however, did not rely solely on obscenity law; it also recognized a 
strong government interest in preventing or limiting the harmful effects it saw as 
demonstrated from violent video games. 17 
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit 
rejected the inclusion of violent material with sexual material as potentially 
obscene when provided to youth. IS The appellate court also rejected any 
connection between video game violence and real world violence. The court's 
view of the social science was that "[t]he studies do not find that video games 
have ever caused anyone to commit a violent act, as opposed to feeling 
aggressive, or have caused the average level of violence to increase anywhere .. 
. . Common sense says that the City's claim of harm to its citizens from these 
games is implausible, at best wildly speculative.,,19 
The second attempt at a limitation was the passage of a St. Louis County 
ordinance, also in the year 2000.20 The ordinance also addressed arcade play by 
minors without parental permission, but limited sales and rentals as well.21 This 
time the age limit was seventeen.22 Once again, the ordinance survived the first 
industry salvo, when the district court refused to enjoin enforcement.23 The 
district court concluded that video game play is not an activity protected by the 
First Amendment.24 That may seem an odd position, but if the creative aspects 
of game, design, artistic, and story presentation, are separated from the act of 
playing the game, an act that communicates to no one, it is a position that may be 
reasonable.25 With regard to harm, the district court could not be more in 
opposition to the earlier Seventh Circuit opinion. As the district court saw it, 
"[f]or plaintiffs to ... argue that violent video games are not harmful to minors 
is simply incredulous.,,26 
On appeal, the Eighth Circuit did not express quite the degree of skepticism 
that the Seventh Circuit had, but still rejected the claims that the games posed a 
15. 390 U.S. 629 (1968). 
16. Am. Amusement Mach. Ass'n, 115 F. Supp. 2d at 946. 
17. Id. 
18. See Am. Amusement Mach. Ass'n, 244 F.3d at 574-76. 
19. Id. at 578-79. 
20. The ordinance is discussed in Interactive Digital Software Ass 'n v. St. Louis County, 200 
F. Supp. 2d 1126, 1129-31 (E.D. Mo. 2002), rev'd, 329 F.3d 954 (8th Cir. 2003). 
21. Id. at 1130. 
22. Id. 
23. Id. at 1141. 
24. Id. at 1135. 
25. See Kevin W. Saunders, Regulating Youth Access to Violent Video Games: Three 
Responses to First Amendment Concerns, 2003 MICH. ST. L. REv. 51, 93-105. 
26. Interactive Digital Software Ass'n, 200 F. Supp. 2d at 1138. 
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danger to youth. Examining what seemed to be a limited submission of the 
available social science research, the court viewed the submissions as consisting 
of a "vague generality [that fell] far short of a showing that video games are 
psychologically deleterious" and the studies as "ambiguous, inconclusive, or 
irrelevant.,,27 The court also held that video games are protected expression under 
the First Amendment, but did not distinguish between game design and game 
play.28 
In the third case, the State of Washington focused restrictive legislation only 
on games in which the player shoots law enforcement officers. 29 The statute 
imposed a ban on distributing such games to minors, and the hope seemed to be 
that this approach, narrowly tailored to concerns over the safety of police officers, 
would survive constitutional challenge, where the others had failed. In addition, 
the State said that it wished to "to foster respect for public law enforcement 
officers. ,,30 
As it turned out, the statute fared no better, and ironically, it was the narrower 
focus that led to its downfall. The federal district court actually seemed receptive 
to the general concerns over media, and especially video game violence, saying 
that the State had 
presented research and expert opinions from which one could reasonably 
infer that the depictions of violence with which we are constantly 
bombarded in movies, television, computer games, interactive video 
games, etc., have some immediate and measurable effect on the level of 
aggression experienced by some viewers and that the unique 
characteristics of video games ... makes video games potentially more 
harmful to the psychological well-being of minors than other forms of 
media. In addition, virtually all of the experts agree that prolonged 
exposure to violent entertainment media is one of the constellation of risk 
factors for aggressive or anti-social behavior .... 31 
What made the statute unconstitutional was the fact that there was no evidence 
that those games in which players shoot law enforcement officers are any more 
dangerous than games in which players shoot other individuals.32 While the court 
found fault in the social science studies submitted by the State, it did indicate that 
statutes that took aim at the most violent games, as opposed to focusing on virtual 
victim's identity, could, with more scientific support, be held constitutional.33 
27. Interactive Digital Software Ass 'n v. St. Louis County, 329 F.3d 954, 959 (8th Cir. 2003). 
28. [d. at 957-58. 
29. The ordinance is discussed in Video Software Dealers Ass'n v. Maleng, 325 F. Supp. 2d 
1180, 1186-90 (W.O. Wash. 2004). 
30. [d. 
31. [d. at 1188. 
32. [d. at 1188-90. 
33. See id. at 1190. The court, while noting that it could not offer advisory opinions, did go 
on to indicate the U[k]ey considerations" in analyzing future violent video game statutes: 
--does the regulation cover only the type of depraved or extreme acts of violence that 
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The results of the first three cases, while all losses in the attempt to restrict 
access by children to violent video games, provided some hope for eventual 
success. Interestingly, the district courts, the courts that regularly make the 
findings of fact, all seemed to see the danger involved in the games. Two were 
convinced and refused to enjoin the ordinances at issue.34 The third also found 
the studies generally plausible, but found fault in the lack of specific results 
regarding law enforcement officers.35 The third court indicated that the continued 
development of the science could lead to holdings of constitutionality.36 
However, in both successful cases the appellate courts not only declared the 
ordinances unconstitutional, but in doing so went against the conclusion of the 
traditional finders of fact and held that violent video games do not pose a danger 
to youth.37 These appellate court decisions would prove to be important in their 
influence on later district court examinations of other statutes. 
After a short lapse there was renewed activity, with 2005 seeing statutes 
adopted in the states of lllinois, California, and Michigan. All three were quickly 
challenged by the video game industry, with the lllinois case being the first to 
reach a final district court decision. The lllinois Violent Video Games Law 
imposed criminal penalties for the sale or rental to minors of violent video games 
and imposed labeling requirements.38 The statute did define the games to be 
considered violent, as had the previous attempts, but the court found the 
definition vague.39 
The court also examined the science offered to support the State's position 
and found it wanting.40 It should be noted that the district court hearing the case 
Id. 
violate community norms and prompted the legislature to act? 
--does the regulation prohibit depictions of extreme violence against all innocent 
victims, regardless of their viewpoint or status? and 
--do the social scientific studies support the legislative findings at issue? 
34. See Interactive Digital Software Ass'n v. St. Louis County, 200 F. Supp. 2d 1126, 1141 
(E.D. Mo. 2002), rev'd, 329 F.3d 954 (8th Cir. 2003); Am. Amusement Mach. Ass'n v. Kendrick, 
115 F. Supp. 2d 943,981 (S.D. Ind. 2000), rev'd, 249 F.3d 572 (7th Cir. 2001). 
35. Video Software Dealers Ass'n, 325 F. Supp. 2d at 1188-90. 
36. Id. at 1190. 
37. See Interactive Digital Software Ass'n, 329 F.3d at 959; Am. Amusement Mach. Ass'n, 
244 F.3d at 578-79. 
38. The statute is discussed in Entertainment Software Ass 'n v. Blagojevich, 404 F. Supp. 2d 
1051, 1057-58 (N.D. Ill. 2005). 
39. See id. at 1076-77. The statute addressed games in which there are '''depictions of or 
simulations of human-on-human violence in which the player kills or otherwise causes serious 
physical harm to another human. "Serious physical harm'" meant "'death, dismemberment, 
amputation, decapitation, maiming, disfigurement, mutilation of body parts, or rape. '" Id. at 1057 
(quoting 720 Iu.. COMPo STAT. 5/ 12A-1O( e) (2006)). The court found vagueness in what constitutes 
a human in the fantasy world of video games and what constitutes serious harm to such creatures, 
who may for example sprout a new arm in the place of one cut off. See id. at 1076-77. 
40. Id. at 1059-75. 
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is a part of the Seventh Circuit, the circuit that had already expressed skepticism 
regarding the science in the Indianapolis case. The State, faced with this previous 
determination, seemed to recognize that it had to rely on newly developed 
science, science on which the circuit had not ruled. The State offered recent 
video games studies and a study on the neurological effects of violent media, but 
the court rejected both.41 
As for the social science, the State brought in Professor Craig Anderson as 
an expert. Professor Anderson is the leading researcher in the area, and that 
turned out, in a way, to be a problem for the State.42 In rejecting the social 
science, the court noted that fourteen of the seventeen scholarly articles in the 
legislative record were authored or co-authored by Professor Anderson, one was 
written by a colleague, and the other two were written by a scientist who relied 
on Anderson's work in developing his own studies.43 Rather than taking this as 
a sign of the preeminence of Professor Anderson, and also seemingly failing to 
recognize the peer review process that the articles had to undergo, the court 
seemed to find that the, in a sense too great, expertise weakened the testimony. 
The court also heard testimony from two other scientists with what it took to 
be views contrary to those of Anderson. Dr. Jeffrey Goldstein, a social scientist 
in the Netherlands, has completed research that shows video games can "improve 
cognitive skill.,,44 That, in fact, seems quite likely, but no one really argues that 
no good can come from the games. The second scientist was a relatively newly 
minted communications professor, Dr. Dmitri Williams, whose dissertation was 
based on a one-month study of individuals playing a violent, multi-player game,45 
but multi-player games contain a social interaction that might distinguish them 
from the video games in Anderson's studies. 
What the industry witnesses testified to was that Anderson's work fails to 
establish causation, although they agreed that there was a correlation between 
exposure to video game violence and increased aggression.46 They also had some 
methodological concerns regarding Anderson's studies,47 but that sort of concern 
may always be raised, and it is again worth noting that Anderson's work was 
subject to peer review. On the causation issue, it should be noted that causation 
is never directly observed. It is always the conjunction, the correlation, of events 
that is present to the senses, and causation is an inference from the circumstances 
and that correlation. It did allow the court to state that it could not determine 
from correlation which way causation runs: "it may be that aggressive children 
may also be attracted to violent video games.,,48 Maybe so, and maybe people 
with precancerous lung irritations are drawn to cigarette smoke and people with 
41. /d. 
42. Jd. at 1059. 
43. Jd. at 1058. 
44. Jd. at 1062. 
45. See id. 
46. See id. 
47. Jd. 
48. Jd. at 1074. 
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low IQs are more inclined to eat lead based paint, but Anderson's laboratory 
studies, again rejected by the court as insignificant, again despite peer review, 
purport to show the direction of causation.49 
The court also was unimpressed at the effect size in Anderson's studies. In 
its analysis of one study involving noise blasts, the court noted that 
on a one to ten scale of intensity, the most "aggressive" violent video 
game players administered an average blast of 5.93, and the least 
"aggressive" non-violent video game players administered an average 
blast of 3.98. There was only a two point difference, and both averages 
were in the middle of the intensity scale.50 
However, the "two point" difference could also be described as a near fifty 
percent increase. It is also not clear what the significance of being near the 
middle of the scale is and whether a two point difference at one end would really 
be any different.51 
The court also addressed the recent brain science results regarding violent 
media. Dr. William Kronenberger testified regarding an experiment in which the 
functioning of the brains of adolescents engaged in a computer recognition task 
were examined using functional magnetic resonance imaging. 52 The results 
showed that adolescents with greater exposure to violent media had a brain 
functioning in the regions of the brain normally associated with aggressive or 
violent behavior or with inhibition that differed from the brain functioning of 
children with less exposure to violent media.53 Furthermore, the functioning of 
the high exposure group was similar to that of adolescents diagnosed with 
disruptive behavioral disorders.54 
In response, the industry offered rebuttal from a cognitive psychologist who 
criticized two assumptions he saw as affecting the studies. The first criticism was 
that it had been assumed that there was a "one-to-one relationship" between 
behaviors and brain regions, and the second was that it had been assumed that a 
decrease in activity in a region of the brain should be considered an impairment 
or deficiency and that "decreased activity can signal expertise or use of an 
alternate method to complete the assigned task.,,55 Even accepting that criticism 
49. Id. at 1060-61 (discussing studies briefly). There is also a citation to an article on the 
causation issue. Id. at 1061 (citing Douglas A. Gentile & Craig A. Anderson, Violent Video 
Games: The Effects on Youth, and Public Policy Implications, in HANDBOOK OF CHILDREN, 
CULTURE, AND VIOLENCE 225, 232 (N. Dowd et al. eds., 2006)). 
50. Id. at 1061. 
51. The percentages would of course change. A two-point increase from eight to ten would 
only be a twenty-five percent increase, while a two-point increase as the lower level approaching 
zero would grow without bound. As to the issue of being mid-scale, it depends entirely on how the 
scale is set up. 
52. Entertainment Software Ass'n, 404 F. Supp. 2d at 1063-65. 
53. Id. 
54. Id. 
55. See id. at 1066. 
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as valid, and there seemed to be no offering of evidence of any such alternative 
method, the result is still that there is a decrease in that region of the brain 
normally responsible for controlling behavior, and the resultant functioning is 
more similar to the functioning of a disruptively behaviorally disordered 
adolescent than a normal adolescent. 
Had that been the end of the court's analysis, coupled with a conclusion that 
the State had not demonstrated the necessity of violent video game bans to meet 
the compelling government interest in the physical and psychological well-being 
of youth, the conclusion might arguably have been wrong, but it would only have 
been another in a short line of cases saying the science is not yet there. The court, 
however, went on to make an error of law that poses a more serious threat to 
future attempts, and if the science is correct, to the nation's youth. 
Adopting the industry's legal theory, the court said that "when it comes to 
regulating expression protected by the First Amendment, the state may regulate 
only expression that meets the requirements of Brandenburg v. Ohio.,,56 As the 
court explained, "the State may regulate protected expression based on the belief 
that it will cause violence only if the expression is directed to inciting or 
producing imminent lawless action, and is likely to incite or produce such 
action.,,57 However, Brandenburg is not the appropriate test. Brandenburg 
concerned a meeting of the Ku Klux Klan and whether the leader of the rally 
could be charged under a criminal syndicalism law.58 It was the culmination of 
a long line of cases stretching from World War I through the Cold War, all of 
which addressed rallies or speeches at which the audience was exhorted to 
perform some illegal act.59 Brandenburg is the test for charges of attempting to 
cause public disorder, criminal solicitation, or accessory liability based on that 
solicitation. It is even an appropriate test for tort liability of a speaker, when a 
member of the speaker's audience commits an unlawful act.60 It is not the 
appropriate test for the sort of public health argument offered in the case of video 
games. 
The inappropriateness of Brandenburg is demonstrated by an admittedly far-
fetched example. Suppose the science developed in the direction of showing that 
56. /d. at 1073 (citing Brandenberg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969». 
57. Id. (citing Brandenberg, 395 U.S. at 447). 
58. See Brandenberg, 395 U.S. at 444-47. 
59. See id. at 447-48. 
60. Thus, Brandenburg is relevant when a victim or victim's survivors sue a video game 
manufacturer on the theory that the crime was the result of video game play. See James v. Meow 
Media, Inc., 300 F.3d 683 (6th Cir. 2002). It was also the relevant test in Zamora v. Columbia 
Broadcasting System, 480 F. Supp. 199 (S.D. Fla. 1979), a case in which the claim was that a 
television caused a criminal act. Furthermore, it was relevant in Rice v. Paladin Enterprises, Inc., 
128 F.3d 233 (4th Cir. 1997), where judgment against the publisher of a manual for contract killers 
was used in the commission of a multiple murder. There was a lack of imminence between the 
publication date and the murders, but the admission by the publisher that it expected and intended 
that the manual be used as it was, combined with the detailed instructions, allowed liability to be 
imposed. Id. at 249. 
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thirty years of violent video game play invariably caused the deterioration of the 
entirety of the brain region or regions responsible for judgment and inhibition. 
Invariably, such players become extremely violent and incapable of controlling 
their emotions. If Brandenburg is the test, the state could not prohibit video game 
play, even in light of this evidence. The video game makers would still not 
intend to incite or produce the lawless action. There would also not be the 
imminence that the court here required, at least until just before the violent effect 
hypothesized was about to occur and clearly after there had been significant 
damage to the players' brains. 
Brandenburg is best seen as a way of meeting strict scrutiny, when the 
concern is intentionally induced lawless action. The serious lawless action 
provides the compelling interest, and the imminence indicates that stopping the 
speech is necessary to that interest. If the act were not imminent, the remedy 
would be counter speech, rather than a ban. However, Brandenburg is not the 
only way to meet strict scrutiny where speech is involved. The Supreme Court, 
in Burson v. Freeman,61 recognized the applicability of the more traditional strict 
scrutiny test. That case involved a Tennessee statute barring campaigning within 
one hundred feet of any polling place.62 While the speech involved, political 
speech, is at the core of the First Amendment, the Court found a compelling 
interest in elections being free from coercion and fraud and that the ban was 
necessary to that interest. 63 
Bans on violent video game play by children may have to meet strict scrutiny, 
assuming the rejection of the obscenity theory of the district court in the 
Indianapolis case and the lack of protection argued by the district court in the St. 
Louis case, but they do not have to meet the test of Brandenburg. Instead, there 
needs to be a compelling government interest, and the physical and psychological 
well-being of youth is such an interest. There also needs to be a demonstration 
that the ban is necessary to that interest, a showing that has so far been seen as 
lacking in the existing science. 
Another recent case declared a California statute unconstitutional.64 The 
opinion broke no new ground in analyzing the scientific evidence. The court 
simply surveyed the prior case law, including the Seventh and Eighth Circuit 
Indianapolis and St. Louis cases, the Washington and lllinois district court 
opinions, and the preliminary injunction against the enforcement of the Michigan 
statute,65 and from those opinions determined that the plaintiffs were likely to 
prevail on the merits of their claim of unconstitutionality.66 
However, the California court did reach several conclusions that are 
61. 504 U.S. 191 (1992). 
62. [d. at 193. 
63. [d. at 199. 
64. See Video Software Dealers Ass'n v. Schwarzenegger, 401 F. Supp. 2d 1034 (N.D. Cal. 
2005). 
65. The opinion and judgment establishing the permanent injunction against the Michigan 
statute is discussed infra note 77 and accompanying text. 
66. Video Software Dealers Ass'n, 401 F. Supp. 2d at 1043-44. 
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important to any continuing efforts to limit the access of children to these games. 
First, the plaintiffs argued that the analytic framework to bring to bear in the case 
is that found in Brandenburg, but the court rejected that approach.67 The court 
recognized that Brandenburg applies to expression directed to producing or 
inciting imminent illegal acts, but it said "[t]he Act seems to be intended more to 
prevent harm to minors than preventing minors from engaging in real-world 
violence."68 As the court recognized, the claims against violent video games are 
not that their designers and manufacturers are trying to induce minors to commit 
violent acts or that they are teaching children dangerous ideology. Rather the 
claims are that the games cause psychological and even neurological damage to 
children, damage which may eventually manifest itself in violence, unintended 
by the game developers and not driven by the developers' ideologies. There have 
also been claims that the games may teach skills that are dangerous for children 
to possess.69 The court applied strict scrutiny, and given the rejection of the 
scientific evidence by other courts, found the statute to fail that test.70 
A second important point from the California court's opinion is found in its 
rejection of the defendants' theory of the case in deciding the strict scrutiny 
standard. As had the prior courts, with the exception of the Indianapolis court, 
the court rejected reliance on Ginsberg v. New Yore' Ginsberg upheld a New 
York statute addressing material that is harmful to minors, using a variable 
obscenity doctrine that judged obscenity by a standard applicable not to adults, 
but to minors.72 The California court did not follow the defense suggestion, 
noting that neither the Supreme Court nor the Ninth Circuit had extended 
67. Id. at 1045. 
68. Id. 
69. David Grossman, a former psychology instructor at the U.S. Military Academy discusses 
the shootings by Michael Carneal at Heath High School in the Paducah, Kentucky area. See DAVE 
GROSSMAN & GLORIA DEGAETANO, STOP TEACHING OUR KIDs TO KILL: A CALL TO ACTION 
AGAINST TV ,MOVIE AND VIDEO GAME VIOlENCE 75-76 (1999). Carneal killed three and wounded 
five, all with wounds to the head or upper torso, with only eight or nine shots. See id. at 76. 
Carneal developed this remarkable accuracy not through firearm training, but through video game 
exposure, and that training was reflected in his manner. See id. Carneal 
never moved his feet during his rampage. He never fired far to the right or left, never 
far up or down. He simply fired once at everything that popped up on his "screen." It 
is not natural to fire once at each target. The normal, almost universal, response is to 
fire at a target until it drops and then move on to the next target. This is the defensive 
reaction that will save our lives, the human instinctual reaction--eliminate the threat 
quickly. Not to shoot once and go on to another target before the first target has been 
eliminated. But most video games teach you to fire at each target only once, hitting as 
many targets as you can as fast as you can in order to rack up a high score. And many 
video games give bonus effects ... for head shots. 
[d. at 75-76. 
70. Video Software Dealers Ass'n, 401 F. Supp. 2d at 1048. 
71. See id. at 1045 (citing Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968)). 
72. Id. 
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Ginsberg beyond the sexual focus of that case.73 However, the court went on to 
state that 
[n]or, on the other hand, have the plaintiffs shown that either the 
Supreme Court or the Ninth Circuit has ever held that sexual obscenity 
represents a unique category of expression that is the only category to 
which a state may permissibly restrict minors' access without running 
afoul of the First Amendment.74 
The California court then, while not following the lead of the Indianapolis court, 
recognized that at the Supreme Court level, and at its own circuit level, the theory 
had not been rejected.75 
The last point to be drawn from this case is in the court's response to the 
plaintiffs assertion that the California statute was unconstitutionally vague. 
Without going into the details of the definitions contained in the statute, the court 
concluded that they were sufficient for the ordinary person to apply to the video 
games at issue.76 Thus, the California court established that the task of defining 
the category of games to which violent video game statutes apply is not 
impossible. Legislatures drafting later statutes may be guided by the approach 
found in the California statute. 
The decision of the Michigan federal district court,77 in striking down that 
state's statute, was less than clear in terms of the applicable theory. It was clear 
that the court rejected the State's reliance on Ginsberg, but when it came to the 
plaintiffs' suggestion that Brandenburg is the proper test, the court stated both 
that test and the strict scrutiny test.78 Since the court indicated that neither test 
would be satisfied,19 in the end it may have made no difference, but again, it 
should be pointed out that the proper test is strict scrutiny. There may be no 
difference now, but if the science continues to develop to the point where the 
need to limit violent video game access is seen as necessary to the well-being of 
youth, the choice of test will be important. 
Still more statutes were enacted in 2006 and quickly met the same fate. A 
Louisiana statute again criminalized the sale or rental to minors of violent video 
games, but it was struck down in Entertainment Software Ass'n v. Foti. 80 The 
federal district court granted a preliminary injunction against the enforcement of 
73. [d. 
74. [d. 
75. On this topic, see generally KEVIN W. SAUNDERS, VIOlENCE AS OBSCENITY: LIMITING 
THE MEDIA'S FiRST AMENDMENT PROTEcrION (1996). 
76. Video Software Dealers Ass'n, 401 F. Supp. 2d at 1041-42. 
77. Entm't Software Ass'n v. Granholm, 426 F. Supp. 2d 646 (E.D. Mich. 2006). The 
Michigan statute provided a defense based on the video games industry's ratings. No one could 
be convicted if the sale was to a person within the age rating for the game involved. 
78. [d. at 651-52. 
79. [d. at 651-55. 
80. 451 F. Supp. 2d 823 (M.D. La. 2006). 
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the ordinance and in doing so, followed the lead of the earlier cases.81 The court 
took as well established that video games enjoy First Amendment protection, and 
since it involved sales rather than play, not drawing the distinction between the 
software and presentation, on the one hand, and game play on the other, was 
proper.S2 Thus, strict scrutiny is required, but this court also seemed to believe 
that the Brandenburg test is the only way to meet strict scrutiny where violent 
media is involved.83 "Seemed" is the right word because the court went on to 
consider evidence that would speak to the dangerousness of the media on a basis 
other than advocacy of violence.84 That evidence was rejected, based primarily 
on the fact that it had been rejected by other courts, but it was also noted that the 
legislative record was rather weak, relying on secondary sources rather than 
primary source psychological studies.85 
A second 2006 statute took a different approach with the same result. A 
Minnesota statute would have imposed a fine for the sale of violent video games 
not on the retailer, but on the minor buying a game rated beyond the child's age.86 
Again the industry challenged the statute, and in Entertainment Software Ass'n 
v. Hatch,S7 the federal district court issued a permanent injunction.8s Following 
previous courts, the court took video games as protected and applied strict 
scrutiny, properly looking for a compelling interest to which the statute was 
necessary or narrowly tailored.89 In so doing, the court found the evidence 
lacking as to video games harming the physical and psychological well-being of 
youth.90 The court was also concerned with the statute's sole focus on video 
81. [d. at 837. 
82. See id. at 829-31. 
83. See id. at 830-33. 
84. See id. at 832. 
85. See id. 
86. MINN. STAT. § 3251.06 (2006). 
87. 443 F. Supp. 2d 1065 (D. Minn. 2006). 
88. /d. at 1073. 
89. [d. at 1068-70. 
90. [d. at 1069. Given that not that much time had elapsed since the previous year's cases, 
the result is certainly not surprising. It is still important to note, however, that as the science 
develops, it may reach the point where prior determinations of inadequacy may no longer apply. 
More disturbing in the opinion is the suggestion that science can demonstrate only correlation 
rather than causation. See id. at 1069-70. The move from correlation to causation is common in 
many other areas, and laboratory experiments and certain factors in longitudinal studies can 
indicate causation. 
There is also a footnote in the opinion that may indicate a lack of understanding of how meta-
analysis works. The court said, seemingly with skepticism, that "Dr. Anderson's meta-analysis 
seems to suggest that one can take a number of studies, each of which he admits do not prove the 
proposition in question, and 'stack them up' until a collective proof emerges." [d. at 1069 n.1. 
That is just what meta-analysis can do, and it makes common sense. The significance of a result 
depends in part on the size of the samples. The fact that a single apple drawn from one barrel is 
sweeter than a single apple drawn from another may not lead one to make confident statements 
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games as a source of danger and with due process in the adoption of a rating 
system developed by a nongovernmental body.91 
All the statutes have been struck down, and that is why the alternative 
presented here is being suggested. The alternative suggestion is not based on any 
conclusion that courts always will continue to reject bans on children's access to 
violent video games. The science may well develop to the point that the bans are 
seen as justified, at least as long as the courts apply the correct strict scrutiny test 
and are not led by the industry into the incorrect view that Brandenburg is the test 
to apply. The suggestion offered is a stopgap measure designed to help parents 
limit their own children's access until that time may come. Of course, if the 
industry prevails on the test to apply or if the science never develops, the 
suggestion made here may have to serve its protective role indefinitely. 
II. RATINGS, STINGS, AND WEB SITE LISTS 
A. The Video Game Industry Rating System 
The Entertainment Software Rating Board ("ESRB") has established a rating 
system for video and computer games.92 Games fall into one of six rating 
categories. A game rated "Early Childhood" is seen as appropriate for ages three 
and older and "[c]ontains no material that parents would find inappropriate.,,93 
Games rated "Everyone" are seen as suitable for everyone aged six or older and 
may contain mild violence.94 "Everyone 10+" rated games are said to be 
appropriate for ages ten and above and may contain an increased amount of mild 
violence.95 "Teen" rated games, seen as appropriate for those thirteen and older, 
"may contain violence ... [and] minimal blood.,,96 Games rated "Mature" are 
said to be suitable for those seventeen and older and "may contain intense 
about the overall differences between the qualities ofthe two lots. A consistent result over a dozen 
makes one more confident and over a gross may give one great confidence. Meta-analysis allows 
the combination of many studies that may involve samples inadequate to establish a result to be 
combined. If the single apple "study" is replaced not by a study of a gross of apples from each 
barrel, but is augmented by an additional 143 single apple studies, the same increase in confidence 
is warranted. 
91. /d. at 1070-71. The Michigan statute had provided a definition for violent video games 
and then allowed the fact that a sale was in accord with the ratings as a defense. Here the offense 
was defined by the ratings. See Entm't Software Ass'n v. Granholm, 426 F. Supp. 2d 646 (E.D. 
Mich. 2006). 
92. Entertainment Software Rating Board, Game Ratings & Descriptor Guide, http://www. 
esrb.org/ratings/ratings~uide.jsp (last visited Nov. 26,2007). The organization's web site explains 
the ratings process, and the ratings and descriptors that result from that process. [d. 
93. [d. 
94. /d. 
95. [d. 
96. [d. 
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violence, blood and gore.,,97 The highest rating, "Adults Only," should be played 
only by those eighteen and older and may include "prolonged scenes of intense 
violence.,,98 Violence is not the only input in the determination of a rating; 
language, sexual themes, and gambling may play roles as well.99 The ESRB also 
provides content descriptors for the games indicating levels or types of violence, 
nudity, drug or alcohol use, etc. 1OO 
The ratings and descriptors are the result of a process spelled out by the 
ESRB. Before they release a game, publishers submit a response to an ESRB 
questionnaire regarding the game's content. 101 The publisher also provides a 
videotape or DVD that is supposed to depict the most extreme content in terms 
of violence, sex, language, etc. 102 The submissions are examined by trained game 
raters, all of whom are adults and typically have professional or parental 
experience with children.103 The raters use their own judgment, but are checked 
for consistency both among the independent raters of the particular game and 
from game to game. 104 If a publisher does not like the rating a game receives, the 
content may be changed or the rating appealed to a board "made up of publishers, 
retailers and other professionals.,,105 
The ratings have no legal force, as the video game cases demonstrate. The 
ESRB can impose sanctions against publishers who voluntarily submit to the 
ESRB's jurisdiction, but that only addresses the rating process itself.106 With 
regard to retail sales, the ESRB says it works with retailers and game centers to 
provide in-store signs explaining the ratings and supports training store 
employees on the ratings system;107 however, there is no enforcement involved. 
There is some dispute as to how effective the ratings are in helping parents 
determine what games are appropriate for their children. A study by researchers 
at Harvard revealed differences over what ratings and descriptors should have 
attached to particular games. 108 Of the games they studied, the researchers found 
97. See id. 
98. /d. 
99. Id. 
100. Id. 
101. Entertainment Software Rating Board, Ratings Process, http://www.esrb.org/ratings/ 
ratings_process.jsp (last visited Nov. 26, 2007). 
102. [d. 
103. [d. 
104. [d. 
105. Id. It is not immediately clear from what profession the professionals are to be drawn. 
106. Entertainment Software Rating Board, Enforcement, http://www.esrb.org/ratingsl 
enforcement.jsp (last visited Nov. 26, 2007). 
107. See id.; see also Entertainment Software Rating Board, Retailers, Frequently Asked 
Questions, http://www.esrb.org/retailers/faq.jsp (noting that game centers that register with ESRB 
may download ratings education material or order ratings signs) (last visited Sept. 1, 2007). 
108. Kevin Haninger & Kimberly M. Thompson, Content and Ratings of Teen-Rated Video 
Games, 291 JAMA 856 (2004), available at www.kidsrisk.harvard.edu/mainFrame/news/faqs4. 
htrnl. 
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that 48% of the sample could have had, but did not have, an ESRB descriptor. I09 
In another 9% of the games there was a descriptor, but the researchers did not 
find the material indicated. 11O This failure to find the material may well be due 
to the fact that the games were played for only one hour, and the material 
described could be in later stages of the games. The study led to 
recommendations that there be greater clarity in the descriptors and in the overall 
rating process and that the rating process include playing the games. III 
The National Institute on Media and the Family also suggests that the ESRB 
ratings underrate some games, rating them as appropriate for teens, when they 
should, in the Institute's view, be rated for a mature audience. 1I2 This criticism 
has been repeated by legislators. For example, Senator Sam Brownback has 
argued for a "Truth in Video Game Rating" Act that would require raters to play 
the games "'in their entirety'" and would provide punishment for rating groups 
that "'grossly mischaracterize'" game content. 1I3 On the House side, 
Congressman Joe Baca has been a regular critic, arguing that the ratings are not 
sufficiently clear and do not provide enough information and that parents are thus 
misled. 114 
On the issue of parents being misled, there is some question as to how much 
input parents have been playing in the purchase of video games. The National 
Institute on Media and the Family found that its survey did not really comport 
with ESRB claims that 74% of parents regularly use the ratings and that 94% find 
them helpfuL 115 Their study showed that while 73% of parents say that they 
always help decide on the games their children buy or rent, only 30% of children 
reported that their parents played such a role. I 16 
Whatever may be the role of parents and the accuracy or appropriateness of 
the ratings, adherence to the ratings at the retail level would provide some 
protection for children. Indeed, it is a protection with which the Michigan statute 
was seemingly satisfied.1I7 If the ratings have little such effect, they are merely 
window dressing. That, of course, leads to the question of retail practices. 
109. Id. 
110. Id. 
111. Id. 
112. DAVIDWALSHET AL.,NAT'LINST.ONMEDIA&THEFAMILY, IITHANNuALMEDIAWISE 
VIDEO GAME REPORT CARD 2 (2006), available at http://www.mediafamily.org/researchl2006_ 
Video_Game_Report_Card.pdf. 
113. See Anne Broache, Senator Wants to Ban "Deceptive" Video Game Ratings, CNET 
NEWS.COM, Feb. 14, 2007, http://www.news.coml2100-1028_3-6159413.html. In response, a 
representative of the Entertainment Software Association questioned whether one could "playa 
game in its 'entirety' when a game has no defined end?" See id. While the games have no defined 
end, they do have finite content that sufficient play would seem likely to expose. 
114. See, e.g., Claire Vitucci, Baca Pushes to Clarify Video-Game Ratings, PE.COM, Apr. 27, 
2006, http://www.pe.comllocalnews/inlandlstorieslPE_News_Local_H. . ..game27.fddc7b9.html. 
115. See WALSHET AL., supra note 112. 
116. Id. 
117. See supra note 77. 
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B. A History of Sting Operations 
The ratings, no matter how much information they may provide, are not 
prohibitions. They can serve a role in letting parents know the content of games 
available for sale or play and guide them in their choices if they purchase games 
for their children. They cannot, without more, limit the ability of children to buy 
the games themselves. Indeed, this has been the focus of statutes tying bans to 
the ratings system. It is an effort, however, that the industry has fought with 
success. Even when the only attempt is to bar sales of games to children below 
the age at which the industry established ratings regime has said is appropriate, 
the industry has balked. Because the ratings have not been legally enforceable, 
the only source of limitation on direct sales to children would have to be with 
retailers and the operators of video arcades. Those limitations have only been 
partially successful. 
The limited success in the retail realm is shown by sting operations or 
undercover shopping. While there are smaller local or state efforts to test the 
vigilance of the retail sector in enforcing the ESRB ratings, 118 there are also more 
widespread, even national, studies. The Federal Trade Commission conducted 
undercover shopping tests in 2000,2001,2003, and 2005. 119 Children between 
the ages of thirteen and sixteen were sent into stores, without a parent, to attempt 
to purchase an M-rated game, that is, a game rated as suitable for those seventeen 
and 01der.120 The most recent study, starting in 2005, but running into January 
2006, tested 406 stores in forty-three states. 121 
The results over the four studies show increasing diligence on the part of 
retailers. In 2000, 85% of the attempts were successful. I22 That dropped to 78% 
in 2001, 69% in 2003, and 42% in 2005.123 While the progress is positive, it is 
still the case that in better than two of five attempts, the child was able to 
purchase an inappropriate game. 
118. See, e.g., Emily Robinson, Sting Targets Video Games, ST. NEWS, Nov. 10, 2000, 
available at http://www.statenews.comlindex.php/articlel2000/11/sting...targets_ video~arnes 
(discussing sting operation by then Michigan Attorney General Jennifer Granholm). The ESRB 
Retail Council requires member retailers to participate in two "mystery shopper" audits per year. 
See Entertainment Software Rating Board, ESRB Retail Council, http://www.esrb.orglretailers/ 
retaiLcouncil.jsp (last visited Aug. 19, 2007). The results, however, are published only "in 
aggregate." [d. 
119. For the results released in March 2006, see FED. TRADE COMM'N, UNDERCOVER SHOP 
FINDS DECREASE IN SALES OF M-RATED GAMES TO CHIlDREN: REsULTS FROM THE 2005 
NATIONWIDE UNDERCOVER SHOP DEMONSTRATE NEED R>R CONTINUING IMPROVEMENT (2006), 
http://www.ftc.gov/opal2006/03/videogameshop.shtm. The publication recounts the results of all 
four studies. 
120. Id. 
121. [d. 
122. /d. 
123. Id. 
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A second measure looked at was whether the cashier or clerk asked the child 
his or her age. The progression in stores asking age, over the four periods 
studied, went from 15% to 21% to 24% to 50%.124 Again, the increase in likely 
inquiry is positive, but 50% of the children were still not asked. 
An interesting difference is seen when stores that are part of a national chain 
are compared with local or regional retailers. At the national retailers, 35% of the 
children were successful, while at the local and regional stores, 63% were 
successful. 125 Of the national retailers, 55% asked the child his or her age, while 
the local and regional retailers asked the child's age only 35 % of the time. 126 
The National Institute for Media and the Family conducted its own series of 
undercover buy attempts. 127 The most recent, conducted in 2006, used a much 
smaller sample of twenty-five retail locations in five states. 128 That series of 
studies in four consecutive years showed a similar decrease in successful 
purchases by children, although not with the same monotonicity. In 2003, 55% 
had been successful; in 2004,34% were successful; in 2005 it was 44%; and in 
2006,32% were successful. 129 The variability in small samples is not surprising, 
and again the general trend in decrease is a positive development. The Institute 
also found the same difference between national and local retailers. Best Buy, 
Target, and Wal-Mart all had perfect scores, but "specialty stores seem more 
interested in making money than anything else," and buys were successful half 
the time. 130 
National chain stores are, of course, also interested in making money. 
Perhaps they are also more socially responsible, but it may instead be that they 
are more wary of negative pUblicity. A failure by a national chain to limit the 
access of children to Mature-rated games could generate national negative 
publicity. The failure of a local store to do so has, so far, seemed to generate no 
publicity aimed at the particular store. While it is worth lauding the practices of 
Best Buy, Target, and Wal-Mart, it would also be worth making available to the 
public the identity of stores that are not as socially responsible. 
There also seems to be a dearth of studies of video game arcades. Perhaps 
this is due to a reluctance to expose the underage testers to the violent depictions 
playing the games would involve. After all, buying the game exposes the child 
only to the box, while playing the game exposes the child to the action of the 
game. Given the largely local nature of video game arcades, it would seem 
reasonable to expect that children would be at least as successful in playing the 
games as they were in buying them from local and regional retailers. There is 
also the fact that there is less likely to be the one-on-one encounter with a clerk 
or cashier that would provide the easy opportunity to ask for an indication of age. 
124. [d. 
125. [d. 
126. [d. 
127. See WAlSH ET AL., supra note 112. 
128. [d. 
129. [d. 
130. [d. 
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C. The 5tingIWeb Site Proposal 
What is proposed here is that there be more regular and widespread conduct 
of undercover shopper and undercover player operations. These operations 
would be coupled with web sites, modeled on the sex offender web site, on which 
those establishments making inappropriate games available to children would be 
listed. Rather than national studies of retailers, which may provide the parent 
with little or no information regarding the local store, local studies would allow 
parents to know where their children can safely shop or play. 
Local or state authorities would arrange for children to attempt to purchase 
age-inappropriate games. The same would occur involving attempts to play 
inappropriate games in video arcades. While there might be reluctance to expose 
children to the violent images in the games, children could at least start to play 
to see if they were interrupted by the arcade operator. Rather than a statistical 
result for success and failure, a list of the individual stores and arcades that failed 
to limit youth access would be compiled. 
The web site aspect of the proposal is necessary to its success. Even if a local 
operation is conducted and there is immediate local publicity, the rapidity with 
which the results would become old news would lessen its impact. If the results 
are maintained on a web site, either one provided by the local government unit 
or perhaps better by a state government web site searchable by postal code, the 
publicity would not fade away. Parents could always turn to the web site to know 
how concerned the retailer or arcade is with their children's exposure to games 
rated beyond their ages. 
There should be follow-up studies, both out of fairness to retailers and arcade 
operators, and so as not to be self-defeating. It would be self-defeating if, once 
a retailer or arcade operator is on the list, it always remained on the list. There 
would then be no incentive to change its practices. Furthermore, a retailer or 
arcade operator that sees the error of its ways ought to have the opportunity to 
clear its record. A later undercover buy or play operation in which the child was 
refused access should remove the retailer or operator from the web site list. The 
follow ups do not have to occur at great regularity because a period on the list is 
to serve as a deterrence, but they should occur at reasonable intervals.!3! 
The effect of these controlled efforts would be to provide a disincentive to 
retailers and arcade operators to provide age-inappropriate games to children. 
Parents have the choice of not allowing their children to shop at stores that are on 
the list. Indeed, parents may themselves choose not to patronize such stores. 
Parents may also choose not to allow their children to spend time at video arcades 
or the malls that contain them, if the arcade does not prevent children from 
playing games rated beyond their age. Parents themselves may also complain to 
131. The most appropriate length of the interval between original and follow up attempts 
would seem to be an empirical question. Experience will indicate how long a retailer or operator 
will have to remain on the list to provide sufficient deterrence, while still providing incentive to 
improve. 
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mall operators or choose not to shop at the malls containing the offending 
arcades. 
Any of these possible effects brings economic pressure on stores and malls 
to prevent children from buying or playing these games. It is important to note 
that the direct economic pressure comes not from the government, but from 
private citizens. It is parents and others who would refuse to shop at or would 
complain to stores and malls. While the governmental entity involved would 
provide the information so that parents know what to target for their criticism, the 
direct pressure is not governmental. The video game industry might well still see 
a First Amendment concern in these operations and web lists, but the program 
should stand up to a First Amendment challenge. 132 
D. Forbidden Fruit 
The possibility of the web site lists serving as an enticement should also be 
briefly considered. The "forbidden fruit" effect in which individuals seek out that 
which is denied them is always a concern with bans. Any forbidden fruit aspect 
of the games themselves is already present in the rating system. The web site list 
does not itself rate games nor need it even indicate which games were 
successfully purchased or played. Children know what games are rated as beyond 
their age from walking through stores or arcades, and they gain no new 
knowledge on that subject from the proposed web site list. 
What children might glean from the list is the places at which others have 
been successful in buying or playing the games. Again, children often know 
where they can obtain goods not allowed to them, and they would probably have 
knowledge of which retailers or arcade operators do not ask for proof of age 
without the benefit of the list. Furthermore, once an entity goes on the list, the 
negative publicity would, one would hope, have the effect of reducing the 
likelihood that age-inappropriate games would continue to be accessible. This is, 
at any rate, a contingent question. If the web site list turns out to be a furtherance 
of children accessing these games, it can be discontinued. It seems more likely 
that the economic pressure against the retailer or mall, where an independent 
retailer or video arcade is involved, would lessen access. 
m. LEGAL ISSUES SURROUNDING THE PROPOSAL 
The First Amendment does not mention speech by the government. In 
limiting the law making authority of the government, the Amendment speaks 
most clearly to the protection of individual expression. This is, of course, the 
variety of expression that needs protection against government limitations. 
Leaving aside cases in which federal and state interests may be at odds, it seems 
strange even to consider the need for the government to protect its speech from 
its own abridgments. Yet, government does, and must, speak regularly. It 
informs the people of its policies and, in providing the rationales for those 
policies, may be seen as advocating positions on political or social issues. This 
132. See infra Part m.A-B. 
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section will provide an examination of some of the early work on government 
speech.133 It will then tum to an examination of the cases in which speech by the 
government has been argued to be an infringement of the speech rights of 
others. l34 Lastly, it will tum to the possible due process issues that may arise in 
compiling the web site list suggested. 135 
A. Government Speech 
An examination of scholarship in the area of government speech must begin 
with the seminal work of Thomas Emerson. 136 Emerson recognized that 
government participation in the public debate is both enriching and essential, but 
that it also poses serious risks: 
Emanating from a source of great authority ... government expression 
carries extra psychological weight for many citizens. It comes from 
officials who often wield enormous actual power over those they address, 
thereby evoking concern in the listener lest he offend the powers that be 
by appearing to oppose. The government controls many of the sources 
of information in the society. It also possesses almost unlimited capacity 
to reach all members of the community .... 137 
Despite this concern, Emerson argued that expression can remain free, as long as 
the government's speech does not overpower other voices. 138 
Emerson analyzed a number of issues arising out of government speech, but 
the one relevant to the discussion here is in a section titled, "Use of Government 
Expression as a Sanction Against Private Expression."139 That would be the 
claim of the video game industry against the sting and web list proposed here. 
Any government sponsored web list would certainly be government expression, 
and the industry would argue that it is an attempt to sanction stores, arcades, and 
malls for their own delivery of expression to children. Emerson sought to balance 
the government's right of expression with the "special impact" it could have on 
the system of free expression. In doing so, he pointed to the concern most often 
raised by the cases. 140 
Most commonly [deterrence or suppression] takes place when the 
133. See infra Part m.A. 
134. See infra Part m.B. 
135. See infra Part m.e. 
136. See THOMAS I. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 697-716 (1970). 
Emerson does cite earlier, less comprehensive works: ZECHARIAH CHAFEE, JR., GoVERNMENT AND 
MASS COMMUNICATIONS: A REPORT FROM THE COMMISSION ON FREEDOM OF THE PRESS (1947); 
Ted Finman & Stewart Macaulay, Freedom to Dissent: The Vietnam Protests and the Words of 
Public Officials, 1966 WIS. L. REv. 632. See EMERSON, supra, at 698 n.!. 
137. EMERSON, supra note 136, at 698. 
138. [d. 
139. See id. at 699-708. 
140. See infra Part m.B. 
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government expression hints at or threatens official reprisals against 
persons or groups holding views in conflict with official policy; or when 
the government expression arouses hostility in the community against 
certain opinions and thereby brings private economic and social 
pressures to bear on those who espouse the unpopular position. 141 
75 
The ftrst of these two possibilities raises the more serious problem. Government 
speech hinting at or threatening a reprisal may certainly suppress private speech 
as effectively as a statute authorizing the same sort of sanction. The second is 
less clear. If the government expresses disagreement with a view and the public 
comes to recognize the danger or foolishness of that view and refuses to deal with 
those expressing it, that may not be a violation of the First Amendment. After all, 
in that situation, the government is not really in any different position than that 
of any influential media ftgure. If, however, there is an implication to the public 
or other entities that they themselves may be threatened by the government if they 
continue to deal with the person or entity whose speech the government does not 
like, that raises a problem similar to the ftrst Emerson presents. 
Emerson ends up concluding that government speech is worth retaining and 
protecting. 142 In fact, he argues that government speech and private speech 
should be accorded the same level of respect and that judicial relief against 
government speech raises similar difficult problems. 
The argument that government officials "must be free to speak . . . 
without fear of criminal or civil liability," and that their right of 
expression "would be of little value if they could be subjected to the cost 
and inconvenience and distractions of a trial," are the same arguments 
that justify the full protection doctrine for private expression. 143 
Professor Emerson's initial foray into the area did not ignite an immediate 
interest in the topic, and when Professor Mark Yudof addressed the issue almost 
a decade later, he still found the topic "largely ignored" in the legal literature. 144 
Professor Yudof argued against the recognition of a constitutional right protecting 
government expression, but again, except in the case of the federal government 
attempting to limit a state government's expression, it would seem that 
government would need little protection against itself. What Yudof appears to 
have most in mind is legislative limits on speech by government officials and a 
challenge by those officials, who as individuals would have First Amendment 
rights, but might be lacking those rights in their official capacities. 145 In that 
regard, Professor Yudof argues that the legislature, rather than a court, is in the 
best position to determine the negatives that may attach to government 
141. EMERSON, supra note 136, at 699-700. 
142. [d. at 706. 
143. [d. 
144. See Mark G. Yudof, When Governments Speak: Toward a Theory of Government 
Expression and the First Amendment, 57 TEx. L. REv. 863, 864 (1979). 
145. See id. at 871. 
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communication, and that leads him to suggest against recogmzmg any 
constitutional right to such expression. l46 That, of course, is not the issue here, 
at least if the web lists suggested have the support, or lack the specific rejection, 
of the legislature. What is at issue is whether individuals have expression rights 
that are violated by government speech. 
Turning to the effect of government speech on the expression of others, 
Yudof recognizes that government speech may overwhelm the speech of others, 
but rejects regulation on that basis because of analytic and institutional 
difficulties. 147 He also rejects limitations against "misleading" speech by 
members of the executive branch, citing Justice Jackson for the proposition that 
"if high level executive officers were held accountable for every misstatement or 
omission, government leadership on vital matters or national concern might well 
come to a halt.,,148 
Professor Yudofs conclusion is to suggest an ultra vires approach for the 
courts not unlike the approach taken in dormant commerce clause cases. 149 It 
should be left to the legislature to set the parameters of government speech. 
"Courts should declare as ultra vires government speech activities that are 
particularly offensive and that are likely to interfere with individual judgment, 
unless they are specifically authorized by legislative bodies."lso It seems unlikely 
that test would result in a court finding a violation in the government speech 
suggested here. There would not seem to be offensiveness, and it is unlikely that 
the web site list would interfere with individual judgment. Given advertising 
budgets and the ability of the video game industry to make its views known, 
government speech would not be so dominant as to prevent the dissemination of 
other views. Secondly, all that Professor Yudof would require, even if the web 
list were offensive and likely to interfere, is that the legislature be on board. It is, 
at most, an argument against unilateral executive action, not against action by the 
government. lSI 
In an article effectively contemporaneous with Professor Yudofs, Professor 
146. See id. 
147. See id. at 897-906. 
148. [d. at 908. Professor Yudoffinds his teachings from Justice Jackson in Jackson's opinion 
in Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. Ill, 118 (1942). 
149. See Yudof, supra note 144, at 917. 
150. [d. 
151. In a more recent article, Professor Yudofrecognized the need for government speech, 
even as a way of policy implementation. 
An effective government must communicate, provide information, publicize its rules, 
educate, persuade and amass public support for policies. These functions are as 
legitimate as providing a national defense, regulating building construction practices, 
providing access to medical care and social security, or delivering the mail. If there is 
a hallmark of modem governments, apart from their bureaucratic structure, it is their 
extraordinary reliance on communication as an instrument of policy. 
Mark G. Yudof, Personal Speech and Government Expression, 38 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 671, 678 
(1988) (footnotes omitted). 
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Steven Shiffrin added his take on government speech. 152 He began by noting that 
the case law did not bar even government prescription of orthodoxy, such as 
requirements that public school texts teach a specific point of view, although the 
right to dissent from that orthodoxy is protected. 153 He also pointed to a number 
of other government actions that require recognition that "speech financed or 
controlled by government plays an enormous role in the marketplace of ideas."I54 
In a search for limitations, Shiffrin, like Yudof, rejects the "drowning out" 
approach, arguing that it lacks practicality and explanatory power. 155 While 
recognizing the problem of possible government domination of the marketplace 
of ideas, Professor Shiffrin recognizes that such domination may sometimes be 
quite acceptable. 156 He concludes that an "eclectic approach ... of definitional 
or general balancing" is what is required. 157 In application, Professor Shiffrin 
would find problems if there are no rules regarding "government departure[] from 
electoral neutrality,,,158 although he recognizes the propriety of government 
communication on controversial initiative issues,159 and clearly an office holder 
can state reasons why the voter should vote to return him or her rather than an 
opponent. Outside the electoral process, Professor Shiffrin says that the task of 
the eclectic approach is "to promote structures that help assure that government 
speech does not overwhelm individual choice."I60 Again, even in that case, he 
recognized that the government's speech may still be justified. 161 As with Yudof, 
in the context of the suggestion offered here, there is not the danger of 
government domination of the media that should even require the balancing 
suggested. 162 
152. See Steven Shiffrin, Government Speech, 27 UCLA L. REv. 565 (1980). 
153. [d. at 567-68 (citing W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943) for the 
protection mentioned). 
154. /d. at 569 (pointing to government access to the mass media, the franking privilege, 
publication of government reports, and grants and subsides affecting communication). 
155. [d. at 595. 
156. [d. at 60 l. Later in the article, he provides the example of a military instructor not having 
the right to teach contrary to the commander's views, not because there is no drowning out, but 
because of the need for uniformity and efficiency. See id. at 607-08. 
157. [d. at 610. 
158. [d. at 655. 
159. See id. at 637. 
160. [d. at 655. 
16l. See id. 
162. In another roughly contemporaneous article, Professor Laurence Tribe addressed the issue 
of government speech. He recognized that government need not remain neutral on controversial 
issues, while recognizing a problem where government speech "drown[sl out private 
communication." LAURENCE H. TRmE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 12-4 (1978). He also 
discussed, in the second edition of his book, the issue raised by the government labeling films as 
propaganda and found that to raise constitutional difficulties. See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 809-12 (2d ed. 1988). For the courts' different view on the "propaganda" 
label, see infra notes 183-200 and accompanying text. 
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B. First Amendment Case Law 
There have been a variety of attempts to analyze the issue of government 
speech in the context of developing case law. These efforts have resulted in 
suggested rules as varied as the government speech analysis preceding the more 
recent cases. One suggestion most deferential to government speech is to find a 
violation of First Amendment rights only when that speech constituted actual 
coercion. 163 Another asks whether the government's speech serves as a restraint 
in a particular case, but then calls for a balancing of the negative and positive 
effects of the government's expression. l64 Still another suggests a rule based on 
whether the recipient of the government's speech felt threatened, whether the 
intent of the government speaker was to censor, and if the censor was effective.165 
Rather than continue in an endeavor to draft general rules, this effort will tum to 
an examination of the cases with an eye to seeing what they say about the violent 
video game proposal contained herein. 
The most important and the first case the video game industry or the retailers 
are likely to cite, in any effort to enjoin the suggested approach, is Bantam Books, 
Inc. v. Sullivan. l66 Bantam Books grew out of the efforts of the Rhode Island 
Commission to Encourage Morality in Youth. 167 The Commission's duties 
included educating the public regarding "obscene, indecent or impure language" 
and pictures in a variety of material and to recommend prosecutions regarding 
material tending to corrupt youth.168 The Commission was also charged more 
generally with combating juvenile delinquency and encouraging morality in 
youth, and it had the authority to investigate, to educate the public, and to 
recommend legislation and prosecution. 169 
The Commission took its assigned duties seriously. 
The Commission's practice [was] to notify a distributor on official 
Commission stationery that certain designated books or magazines 
distributed by him had been reviewed by the Commission and had been 
declared by a majority of its members to be objectionable for sale, 
distribution or display to youths under 18 years of age .... 
163. See Jeffrey Brian Greenstein, The First Amendment v. The First Amendment: The 
Dilemma o/Inherently Competing Rights in Free Speech-Based "Constitutional Torts," 71 UMKC 
L. REv. 27, 57 (2002). 
164. See Brian C. Castello, Note, The Voice 0/ Government as an Abridgment 0/ First 
Amendment Rights o/Speakers: Rethinking Meese v. Keene, 1989 DUKE LJ. 654, 681-85. 
165. See Beth Orsoff, Note, Government Speech as Government Censorship, 67 S. CAL. L. 
REv. 229, 251-54 (1993). 
166. 372 U.S. 58 (1963). 
167. Id. at 59. The members of the Commission were appointed by the Governor and served 
five-year terms. Id. at 60 n.1. They were not paid for their work, although the State did cover the 
expenses of the Commission. /d. 
168. Id. at 59-60. 
169. /d. at 60 n.!. 
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The typical notice ... either solicited or thanked [the distributor] in 
advance, for his "cooperation" with the Commission, usually reminding 
[the distributor] of the Commission's duty to recommend to the Attorney 
General prosecution of purveyors of obscenity. Copies of the lists of 
"objectionable" publications were circulated to local police departments, 
and [the distributor] was so informed in the notices. 170 
79 
It is not surprising that the distributors took the notices seriously. The reaction 
of the major distributor in the state of the targeted publications was to refuse to 
fill any new orders for the publications in the notice, to not fill pending orders, 
and to order his representatives to pick up all unsold copies from the retailers to 
be returned to the publishers. l7l Police would usually visit the distributor, shortly 
after the notice was sent, and the distributor was able to demonstrate his 
"cooperation," but as his testimony indicated, he took actions not out of public 
spirit, but out of a fear of court action. 172 
The response of the major distributor had a strong negative impact on the 
availability in the state of the targeted books, and the books' publishers sought 
an injunction against the activities of the Commission. 173 The defendants 
contended that the body of obscenity law recognizing the fine line between the 
obscene and the non obscene, and the procedural requirements attached to 
determining the side of the line on which material fell, did not apply to their 
activities "because it does not regulate or suppress obscenity but simply exhorts 
booksellers and advises them of their legal rights.,,174 
The Court did not accept the distinction between the Commission's work and 
other efforts at addressing obscenity. 
This contention, premised on the Commission's want of power to apply 
formal legal sanctions, is untenable. It is true that appellants' books have 
not been seized or banned by the State, and that no one has been 
prosecuted for their possession or sale. But though the Commission is 
limited to informal sanctions-the threat of invoking legal sanctions and 
other means of coercion, persuasion, and intimidation-the record amply 
demonstrates that the Commission deliberately set about to achieve the 
suppression of publications deemed "objectionable" and succeeded in its 
aim. We are not the first court to look through forms to the substance 
and recognize that informal censorship may sufficiently inhibit the 
circulation of publications to warrant injunctive relief. 175 
In support of that last sentence, the Court cited to cases that involved threats 
of prosecution or license revocation, or notices or listings by police chiefs or 
170. [d. at 61-63 (footnote omitted). 
171. [d. at 63. 
172. [d. 
173. [d. at 61. 
174. /d. at 66. 
175. /d. at 66-67 (footnotes omitted). 
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prosecutors of supposedly obscene, or objectionable films and publications. 176 
All of these instances seem to include a direct threat or the sort of implied threat 
of prosecution also found in this case.177 
It is clear in the Court's remaining analysis that it is this implied threat that 
is the crux of the violation. As the Court noted, "[p ]eople do not lightly disregard 
public officers' thinly veiled threats to institute criminal proceedings against them 
if they do not come around."I78 It was this threat of criminal prosecution that 
made the difference. 
Herein lies the vice of the system. The Commission's operation is 
a form of effective state regulation superimposed upon the State's 
criminal regulation of obscenity and making such regulation largely 
unnecessary. In thus obviating the need to employ criminal sanctions, 
the State has at the same time eliminated the safeguards of the criminal 
process .... The Commission's practice ... provides no safeguards 
whatever against the suppression of nonobscene, and therefore 
constitutionally protected, matter. It is a form of regulation that creates 
hazards to protected freedoms markedly greater than those that attend 
reliance upon the criminal law .179 
The Commission's work was, in the Court's view, a form of administrative 
prior restraint that faced the heavy, almost unbearable, burden due such 
systems. 180 Even though prior restraints, in the form of injunctions, may be 
obtained for obscene materials,181 the sort of judicial review required for such 
injunctions was not present under the Commission's procedures. 182 
176. Id. at 67 n.8. 
177. There is also a Supreme Court case making it clear that vagueness is a problem for 
statutes that impose classification, particularly under a statute that allows fines and license 
revocation. In Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. Dallas, 390 u.S. 676 (1968), the Court considered the 
work of a classification board determining the suitability of films for children. There were fines 
for exhibiting such films without notice of a classification of unsuitable or for knowingly admitting 
a child under sixteen unaccompanied by a parent or spouse, and the potential loss of license to show 
such films for repeated violations of the statute. Id. at 680. The Court said that "[v ]agueness and 
[its] attendant evils ... are not rendered less objectionable because the regulation of expression is 
one of classification rather than direct suppression." Id. at 688. In a separate challenge to the same 
statute, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit objected to the inclusion of violent films 
with those involving sexual expression. See Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. Dallas, 366 F.2d 590 (5th Cir. 
1966). The Supreme Court case stemmed from a state court decision. See Interstate Circuit, Inc. 
v. Dallas, 402 S.W.2d 770 (Tex. Ct. App. 1966), affd, 390 U.S. 676 (1968). 
178. Bantam Books, Inc., 372 U.S. at 68. 
179. Id.at69-70. 
180. Id. at 70; see, e.g., Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931). 
181. See Kingsley Books, Inc. v. Brown, 354 U.S. 436 (1957). 
182. Bantam Books, Inc., 372 U.S. at 71. The Court also noted that, while the assigned focus 
of the Commission's work was the morality of youth, the effect of the procedures employed was 
also to deprive adult readers the opportunity to obtain the works listed. See id. There have been 
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The video game industry could, then, try to make out similar claims against 
sting/web site operations. The key difference between what was found 
constitutionally flawed in Bantam Books and what is suggested here is the lack 
of a criminal threat to make the effort truly coercive. It was perhaps the not so 
subtle threat of prosecution that made the Rhode Island Commission's operations 
a system of prior restraint. In the case of video games, the approach is 
constitutional due to the fact that selling the games to children, even if the 
children are below the age suggested by the industry ratings, is not illegal. The 
industry's thus far successful effort to keep such sales legal removes the coercive 
force from the publicity attendant to the operation of the sting and maintenance 
of the web site. 
The web site is still, however, government speech that, in a sense, disparages 
a variety of video games and may chill sales of those games. That might be 
argued to be sufficient to violate the First Amendment rights of designers and 
manufacturers/publishers, but there are several cases that speak against this 
argument. 
The Supreme Court addressed a somewhat analogous issue in Meese v. 
Keene. 183 Keene grew out of a challenge to certain aspects of the Foreign Agents 
similar later efforts specifically aimed at adult magazines. See Council for Periodical Distribs. 
Ass'n v. Evans, 642 F. Supp. 552 (M.D. Ala. 1986), affd in part, vacated in part, 827 F.2d 1483 
(lith Cir. 1987) (vacating lower court's order on attorney's fees). There, the local district attorney 
employed informal means to suppress Playboy, Newlook, and Penthouse magazines, meeting with 
distributors, suggesting that the magazines may be obscene under state law, but offering a civil 
consent decree agreeing not to sell the magazines that could obviate the need for criminal 
prosecution. /d. at 554-57. The court had no difficulty in finding a sufficient threat in the 
suggestion as to be unconstitutional under Bantam Books. Id. at 562-65. Indeed, the court saw the 
only difference between the two cases being that the threats in the Alabama case were "less subtle" 
and the "threats of criminal prosecution more direct." Id. at 563; see also Bee See Books, Inc. v. 
Leary, 291 F. Supp. 622 (S.D.N. Y. 1968) (enjoining police commissioner's practice of continually 
stationing uniformed police officers in bookstore). 
In what might seem a contrary case, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit allowed 
a state prosecutor and state police officer to operate informally. In State Cinema of Pittsfield. Inc. 
v. Ryan, 422 F.2d 1400 (1 st Cir. 1970), the court considered a request for an injunction against the 
prosecutor and officer from threatening arrest and prosecution for the exhibition of a particular film 
or the seizure of the film, should the plaintiff fail to comply with the order. The court distinguished 
the case from those brought against book and magazine distributors in that the advice here was 
private and not a notice of disapproval delivered to the public. Id. at 1402. Further, advice directed 
to a distributor was seen as unlikely to be challenged, given the large number of titles distributors 
carry and the marginal value of challenging advice suggesting that a few not be distributed. /d. 
The film exhibitor had the incentive to contest the advice, and the lack of a public aspect to the 
notice would not cut into ticket sales. Id. The court found a good faith attempt to enforce the state 
law, and it would not let the informal manner used lead to a finding of unconstitutionality without 
bad faith. Id. 
183. 481 U.S. 465 (1987). 
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Registration Act. 184 The Act addressed, in part, the distribution of films produced 
by a foreign government and aimed at influencing the public regarding a political 
or public interest of that government. 185 Such films faced certain reporting 
requirements and would be classified and labeled as "political propaganda.,,186 
The determination of whether the film did have the aim that activates the political 
propaganda provisions was left to the Registration Unit of the Justice 
Department. 187 In Keene, the Registration Unit determined that three 
environmental films produced by the government funded National Film Board of 
Canada, two on acid rain and one on the perils of nuclear war, were within the 
scope of the provisions. 188 
The challenge was brought by an elected official in California who wished 
to show the films, but feared a negative public reaction to his showing foreign 
"political propaganda" and the negative impact that could have on his political 
career. 189 The Court was unswayed by the state senator's concerns, noting that 
the word "propaganda" has two meanings. l90 One of the meanings may be the 
slanted and misleading speech with which the plaintiff would not want to be 
associated, but it also includes fully accurate advocacy materials deserving of 
close attention, and both are considered proper usage. 191 
The Court refused to find any First Amendment violation. 192 The Act did not 
prohibit, restrain, or even burden distribution. 193 Nor did the government censure 
the films. 194 
To the contrary, Congress simply required the disseminators of such 
material to make additional disclosures that would better enable the 
public to evaluate the import of the propaganda. The statute does not 
prohibit appellee from advising his audience that the films have not been 
officially censured in any way. Disseminators of propaganda may go 
beyond the disclosures required by statute and add any further 
information they think germane to the public's viewing of the 
materials. 195 
The video game industry may argue that the case is inapposite, since the web site 
might well be seen as censure, rather than as simply providing information for 
parental use. Interestingly, this issue is addressed by another case hearing a 
184. /d.; 22 U.S.C. §§ 611-621 (1982). 
185. See Keene, 481 U.S. at 469-70. 
186. [d. at 470-71. 
187. See id. 
188. /d. at 468,480-81. 
189. /d. at 467-68. 
190. [d. at 477. 
191. [d. at 477-78. 
192. [d. at 485. 
193. /d. at 480. 
194. [d. 
195. /d. at 480-81 (footnotes omitted). 
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separate challenge to the same statute and films under review in Keene. 
In Block v. Meese,l96 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia 
Circuit heard an appeal arising from a challenge brought by a distributor of the 
same Canadian films. While taking the same view as the Supreme Court that 
there is no limitation on distribution and no actual expression of government 
disapproval in the use of the word "propaganda," the opinion, written by now 
Justice Scalia,197 goes beyond the Supreme Court's analysis to consider in some 
detail the result, if "propaganda" were to be considered a term of disapproval. 
His conclusion is that, even if the labeling were an expression of disapproval of 
the ideas conveyed, there is no precedent or reason to find that labeling 
unconstitutional. 198 "Not every governmental action which affects speech 
implicates the first amendment."I99 
Judge Scalia went on to address government speech that is critical of the 
ideas put forth by other speakers. 
We know of no case in which the first amendment has been held to be 
implicated by governmental action consisting of no more than 
governmental criticism of the speech's content. Nor does any case 
suggest that "uninhibited, robust, and wide-open debate" consists of 
debate from which the government is excluded, or an "uninhibited 
marketplace of ideas" one in which the government's wares cannot be 
advertised .... 
. . . A rule excluding official praise or criticism of ideas would lead 
to the strange conclusion that it is permissible for the government to 
prohibit racial discrimination, but not to criticize racial bias; to 
criminalize polygamy, but not to praise the monogamous family; to make 
war on Hitler's Germany, but not to denounce Nazism. It is difficult to 
imagine how many governmental pronouncements, dating from the 
beginning of the Republic, would have been unconstitutional on that 
view of things. 200 
Indeed, the court seems correct. Many actions of government implicate and 
criticize the ideas of others. A presidential statement or the State of the Union 
Address may well criticize the ideas advocated by the other party. This official 
statement, as disparaging as it may be of others' political views, would not 
reasonably be seen as a violation of the First Amendment rights of those holding 
and expressing those other views. The same should be true of a congressional 
resolution approving of one position and disapproving of another. If critical 
speech by the government were a First Amendment violation, only those out of 
196. 793 F.2d 1303 (D.C. Cir. 1986). 
197. Justice Scalia had gone on to the Supreme Court by the time Meese v. Keene reached that 
Court and took no part in the decision in that case. The panel for Block v. Meese included not only 
Judge Scalia, but also Judges Bork and Wright. [d. at 1306. 
198. [d. at 1312. 
199. [d. (citing Regan v. Taxation with Representation, 461 U.S. 540, 546 (1983». 
200. Jd. at 1313. 
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power could engage in political debate. Their speech, alone, would be 
nongovernmental and not restricted by this view of the First Amendment. 
Applying the reasoning of the D.C. Circuit opinion to the video game context, 
it may be argued that limiting government disparagement would not have the 
same effect on the political debate, and, thus, any disapproval expressed by a 
web-based list should be seen as a violation of the First Amendment rights of 
game designers and producers. If anything, the distinction should cut in the 
opposite direction. The speech examples in Judge Scalia's opinion were political 
speech,20I and that sort of speech is the most protected form of speech. If 
members of the government can criticize Nazism, it would seem that they could 
also criticize games such as Ethnic Cleansing, in which players take on Nazi roles 
and carry out virtual missions that would have had Nazi approva1.202 
Government warnings about violent video games are similar to statements on 
public health, and even if the public health concerns have not yet been 
sufficiently proven as to justify bans on video games, the statements may be made 
in an effort to inform the public. Any web site list would still not constitute a 
ban, and government warnings or even disapproval fall short, in the view of the 
D.C. Circuit, of implicating the First Amendment rights of the video game 
industry or of those who would play the games. 
There is also a somewhat more recent case from the D.C. Circuit that is 
relevant here. In Penthouse International, Ltd. v. Meese,203 the court addressed 
an action by the Attorney General's Commission on Pornography. The 
procedural aspects of the case are rather convoluted. The Commission held 
hearings on pornography and its availability to the public.204 Based on those 
hearings, it sent a letter to a number of corporations indicating that the 
Commission had received evidence that the corporation was involved in the 
distribution of pornography and saying that the Commission thought it 
appropriate to allow the corporation to respond before the Commission issued its 
report on the distributors of pomography.205 For example, the response of 
Southland Corporation, the parent of the 7 -Eleven chain, was to tell the 
Commission that they had decided to stop selling adult magazines and hoped that 
their name would be left out of any final report.206 
In an earlier case, Playboy Enterprises, Inc. v. Meese,207 Playboy and 
Penthouse sought an injunction against the publication of any "blacklist" of 
corporations distributing their magazines. 208 The court there decided that the 
201. See id. 
202. For a description of the game, see Racist Groups Using Computer Gaming to Promote 
Violence Against Blacks, Latinos and Jews, ANTI-DEFAMATION LEAGUE, Feb. 19, 2002, 
http://www.adl.orglvideogames/default.asp. 
203. 939 F.2d 1011 (D.C. Cir. 1991). 
204. /d. at 1012-13. 
205. [d. at 1013. 
206. [d. 
207. 639 F. Supp. 581 (D.C. Cir. 1986). 
208. /d. at 582-84. 
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magazines were likely to prevail on the merits of a First Amendment claim since 
the letters were an informal system of government censorship and a system of 
prior restraints, and issued a preliminary injunction.209 The court ordered the 
Commission to withdraw the letters, to so inform the corporations to which they 
had been addressed, and to refrain from naming any corporations in the final 
report.210 In a case in which the magazines might better have left well enough 
alone, they instead persisted in pursuing a permanent injunction, declaratory 
relief, and a damages action.2l1 The defendants sought summary judgment on the 
grounds that the equitable claims were now moot and that the damages were 
barred by qualified immunity.212 The district court granted the summary 
judgment motion,213 and Penthouse appealed.214 
When the D.C. Circuit considered the claim, the court seemed less hospitable 
to the First Amendment claims.215 Penthouse argued that the Commission had 
attempted to prevent or chill the distribution of constitutionally protected 
magazines and that the case fit within the parameters of Bantam Books.216 The 
court, however, found the cases to be distinguishable. In the instant case, the 
court found an advisory commission lacking the tie to prosecutorial power 
present in the Bantam Books case and no authority to censor.2I7 The present case 
also lacked threats of prosecution or other indications that the Commission was 
trying to ban distribution.218 Penthouse suggested that the corporations receiving 
the letters would think they were being threatened, but the court was not 
swayed.219 The court thought the Commission may have come close to 
suggesting that it had more power than it, in fact, did possess, but noted that the 
Commission had never threatened to use the state's coercive powers against the 
corporations receiving the letters.220 
Speaking more generally, and in terms that are particularly important to the 
issue under consideration here, the court went on to say: 
We do not see why government officials may not vigorously criticize a 
publication for any reason they wish. As part of the duties of their office, 
these officials surely must be expected to be free to speak out to criticize 
practices, even in a condemnatory fashion, that they might not have the 
209. [d. at 587-88. 
210. [d. at 588. 
211. Penthouse, 939 F.2d at 1012. 
212. [d. 
213. Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Meese, 746 F. Supp. 154 (D.C. Cir. 1990). 
214. Penthouse, 939 F.2d at 1011. 
215. The D.C. Circuit opinion is categorized as an affinnance, but it is an affinnance of the 
grant of summary judgment refusing additional equitable relief and damages. [d. at 1020. 
216. [d. at 1014-15. 
217. [d. at 1015. 
218. [d. 
219. [d. 
220. [d. 
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statutory or even constitutional authority to regulate. If the First 
Amendment were thought to be violated any time a private citizen's 
speech or writings were criticized by a government official, those 
officials might be virtually immobilized.221 
Even accepting the claims of Penthouse that the letter was a threat to blacklist the 
corporations distributing the magazines. The court saw the charge "with the 
rhetoric drawn out" as no more than a threat publicly to embarrass the 
corporations and that this was a perfectly legal option.222 
[C]orporations and other institutions are criticized by government 
officials for all sorts of conduct that might well be perfectly legal, 
including speech protected by the First Amendment. At least when the 
government threatens no sanction--criminal or otherwise-we very 
much doubt that the government's criticism or effort to embarrass . . . 
threatens anyone's First Amendment rights.223 
The opinion was not unanimous in its First Amendment analysis. Judge 
Randolph concurred in affirming the denial of additional equitable relief and 
damages, but did not join fully in the First Amendment portions of the opinion.224 
Judge Randolph read the majority opinion as suggesting that the government may 
even make false, derogatory statements to interfere with the distribution of 
protected material. 225 Instead, he would draw a line between cases where the 
statements were true or even the result of inadvertent misstatement and 
intentional falsity calculated to bring about an injury to expression rights.226 
In still another case from the D.C. Circuit, the court refused to find a 
constitutional violation in a situation in which an order by the Federal 
Communications Commission ("FCC") might have seemed to include an implied 
threat of license revocation directed at radio stations. Yale Broadcasting Co. v. 
FCC227 considered an order by the FCC regarding "drug oriented" music.228 The 
FCC order "remind[ed] broadcasters of a pre-existing duty, required licensees to 
have knowledge of the content of their programming and on the basis of this 
knowledge to evaluate the desirability of broadcasting music dealing with drug 
221. Id. at 1015-16 (citation omitted). 
222. Id. at 1016. 
223. Id. The court did point to one case in which it had found a violation in attempts to disrupt 
political activities by publishing false allegations about the targeted group. Id. (citing Hobson v. 
Wilson, 737 F.2d 1, 28 (D.C. Cir. 1984)). The court distinguished that case by noting the secret 
"agents provocateurs" role of the FBI agents in that case compared to what was seen as open 
criticism present in the instant case. Id. 
224. [d. at lO20 (Randolph, J., concurring). 
225. Id. 
226. Id.; but see supra note 223. 
227. 478 F.2d 594 (D.C. Cir. 1973). 
228. Id. at 595. 
HeinOnline -- 41 Ind. L. Rev. 87 2008
2008] SHIELDING CHILDREN 87 
use.,,229 The order had stated that the FCC was not banning the play of "drug 
oriented" records and that there would be no reprisals against stations playing 
such music, but that it was still necessary for broadcasters to know the contents 
of what they broadcast and to make their own judgment as to the wisdom of 
broadcasting such music.230 
A radio station argued that the order was a violation of its free speech rights, 
but the court found no such problem.231 The task of knowing the contents of the 
music on the playlist was not seen as burdensome, given the FCC's suggestions 
as to how such knowledge could be obtained, including from listener 
complaints.232 The better argument by the station owner would seem to be the 
implicit threat behind the order. The court noted that licensees are required to 
operate in the public interest and that the knowledge required in the order was 
necessary for the station to know if it was meeting that requirement.233 The 
implication would seem to be that by playing "drug oriented" music, presumably 
constitutionally protected matter, the stations would be violating their public 
interest mandate. The court, however, said, "[f]ar from constituting any threat to 
freedom of speech of the licensee, we conclude that for the Commission to have 
been less insistent on licensees discharging their obligations would have verged 
229. /d. 
230. [d. at 596. An implied threat would, of course, have made a difference. Another FCC 
case, this time involving television violence, provides an example. See Writers Guild of Am., W., 
Inc. v. FCC, 423 F. Supp. 1064 (C.D. Cal. 1976), vacated, 609 F.2d 355 (9th Cir. 1979). In the 
mid-1970s, pressure was asserted against broadcasters to reduce violence, play it during hours when 
children were less likely to be in the audience, and include warnings. /d. at 1099-1128. The 
provisions were implemented by the National Association of Broadcasters (the "Association"), 
against a background of a concerted effort by the FCC and members of Congress, complete with 
threats that should "voluntary efforts" fail, there would be legislation. [d. The provisions were 
challenged by those involved in the creative aspects of the television industry. /d. In the federal 
district court, the policy was invalidated on the ground that the Association's rules were the result 
of these threats and a violation of the First Amendment rights of writers, actors, directors, and 
producers. [d. at 1161. The district court opinion was vacated by the U.S. Court of Appeals for 
the Ninth Circuit on the grounds that the FCC had primary jurisdiction to hear the complaints. See 
Writers Guild of Am., W., Inc. v. Am. Broad. Co., 609 F.2d 355 (9th Cir. 1979). For an argument 
that the vacating of the opinion has led the FCC not to learn the lessons of the district court's 
analysis, see Robert Com-Revere, Television Violence and the Limits of Voluntarism, 12 YAlE J. 
ON REG. 187 (1995) (discussing efforts in the mid-1990s also to limit television violence). 
The case does not speak to the video game proposal offered here. The FCC clearly has 
regulatory authority over the broadcast industry. That authority causes "suggestions" to be taken 
very seriously. When the prospect of legislation is added, the compulsion may reach the level of 
being a violation of the First Amendment. At least at this point, there is no similar regulatory 
authority over the video game industry. 
231. Yale Broad. Co., 478 F.2d at 597-99. 
232. [d. at 600-01. 
233. [d. at 598. 
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on an evasion of the Commission's own responsibilities. ,,234 The court pointed 
out that the plaintiff had recently had its license renewed, and there had been no 
showing of any broadcaster having failed to have a license renewed based on the 
order.235 The court further noted that if there should be an unfair license denial, 
then legal redress would be available. 236 
This seems to be the sort of situation actually addressed by Bantam Books. 
There may be a sufficient threat that compliance is obtained and protected 
material is limited, without any action by a court. Only if a broadcaster is willing 
to risk its license to challenge the order will there be a legal determination of the 
constitutionality of this system of informal restraints. Yale Broadcasting moved 
for rehearing en banc, and although the motion was denied, Judge Bazelon did 
issue a statement as to why a rehearing should have been granted in recognition 
of the threat to the First Amendment rights of the broadcasters. 
Talk of "responsibility" of a broadcaster in this connection is simply 
a euphemism for self-censorship. It is an attempt to shift the onus of 
action against speech from the Commission to the broadcaster, but it 
seeks the same result-suppression of certain views and arguments. 
Since the imposition of the duty of such "responsibility" involves 
Commission compulsion to perform the function of selection and 
exclusion and Commission supervision of the manner in which that 
function is performed, the Commission still retains the ultimate power to 
determine what is and what is not permitted on the air.237 
Judge Bazelon seems correct in his observations, but even here the court allowed 
this system of informal restraints. This may be a weakening of the case law 
protecting speech from such informal restraints, but even if the court would have 
agreed with Judge Bazelon, the case is still distinguishable from the program 
suggested here. The Bazelon view still rests on the power of the government to 
revoke or to not renew a license. No such power is available to the state in a 
program that lets parents know which stores and arcades make violent or sexually 
explicit games available to children younger than appropriate under the industry 
rating system. 
Even government speech casting individuals in a very negative light has 
passed First Amendment scrutiny. In American F amity Ass 'n v. City and County 
of San Francisco,238 the court considered a campaign against the advertising effort 
of the American Family Association. The advertisements took positions against 
homosexual activities, employing a Christian point of view.239 A full page ad in 
the San Francisco Chronicle asserted that God abhors all sexual sin and that 
234. [d. at 599. 
235. [d. at 602. 
236. [d. 
237. [d. at 605. 
238. 277 F.3d 1114 (9th Cir. 2002). 
239. [d. at 11l8. 
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homosexuals "[make] a choice in yielding to temptation.,,240 It went on to 
complain about the reaction to the association's and similar organizations' 
positions on homosexuality.241 The groups had been labeled as bigots and 
homophobes and said all they wanted was a reasoned debate on the issue.242 
The Board of Supervisors for the City and County of San Francisco wrote to 
the plaintiffs blaming the murder of Matthew Shepard, in part, on the messages 
promulgated by groups like the American Family Association.243 The letter went 
on to say, "[i]t is not an exaggeration to say that there is a direct correlation 
between these acts of discrimination, such as when gays and lesbians are called 
sinful and when major religious organizations say they can change if they tried, 
and the horrible crimes committed against gays and lesbians.,,244 
The Board also passed two resolutions. One condemned another murder of 
a homosexual and "call[ed] for the Religious Right to take accountability for the 
impact of their long-standing rhetoric denouncing gays and lesbians, which leads 
to a climate of mistrust and discrimination that can open the door to horrible 
crimes [against gays and lesbians].,,245 The second resolution addressed anti-gay 
television ads.246 The resolution included the name of one of the plaintiffs, noted 
that "a prominent San Francisco newspaper" had accepted and published ads 
opposing toleration for gays and lesbians, and suggested that the "ads suggesting 
gays or lesbians are 'immoral and undesirable create an atmosphere which 
validates oppression of gays and lesbians' and encourages maltreatment of 
them.,,247 The resolution also claimed that a marked increase in violence against 
gays coincides with such campaigns and called on local television stations not to 
air ads aimed at converting homosexuals to heterosexuality.248 
The court's analysis was somewhat complex because the plaintiffs, instead 
of filing a free speech claim, filed a complaint based on the Establishment and 
Free Exercise Clauses of the First Amendment.249 The free speech issue was, 
nonetheless, important to the Free Exercise claim.250 Such claims must either 
assert that the law or practice at issue is not a general law or practice neutrally 
240. [d. at 1118-19. 
241. [d. at 1119. 
242. /d. 
243. /d. 
244. [d. 
245. [d. 
246. [d. 
247. [d. at 1120. 
248. [d. 
249. [d. 
250. The court found no merit in the plaintiffs' Establishment Clause claim. [d. at 1123. This 
position did, however, cause Judge Noonan to dissent. Since the case came to the court as an 
appeal of the grant of summary judgment to the defendants, Judge Noonan noted that the plaintiffs' 
allegations must be accepted as true. [d. at 1126 (Noonon, J., dissenting). Accepting those 
allegations, he felt that there was a triable issue as to whether the Board had expressed official 
condemnation ofthe plaintiffs' religious beliefs. [d. at 1126-27. 
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applied, but is instead aimed at religion, or that there is both a restriction on 
religious exercise and the implication of an additional constitutional right. 251 The 
additional constitutional right offered was the free speech right of the plaintiffs. 252 
In response, the court said that the only cases in which government criticism of 
speech was unconstitutional were cases in which there was government conduct 
beyond the criticism.253 The court refused to extend these cases and said: "We 
agree with the host of other circuits that recognize that public officials may 
criticize practices that they would have no constitutional ability to regulate, so 
long as there is no actual or threatened imposition of governmental power or 
sanction.,,254 Finally, in denying the violation of free speech, the court said: 
[AJlthough the Defendants may have criticized Plaintiffs' speech (or at 
least the perceived effect of it) and urged television stations not to air it, 
there was no sanction or threat of sanction if the Plaintiffs continued to 
urge conversion of homosexuals or if the television stations failed to 
adhere to the Defendants' request and aired the advertisements.255 
It appears, then, that government speech, when it is critical of the speech of 
others, may be very critical,256 There seems to be no need to pull punches, and 
it would seem that the asserted correlations on which the Board's claims rested 
are no better established than those surrounding violent video games. That seems 
to imply that a web site could assert the claim that the games are detrimental to 
251. Employment Div., Dep't of Human Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 878-81 (1990). 
252. Am. Family Ass'n, 277 F.3d at 1124. 
253. Id. 
254. Id. at 1125. 
255. Id. Judge Noonan also dissented on this issue. As he read the complaint, Plaintiffs 
alleged that the television stations refused to air plaintiffs' ads in part because of the Board's 
resolution. /d. at 1127 (Noonan, J., dissenting). From this, Judge Noonan said it was a fair 
inference that the television stations felt some compulsion. Id. It is not clear that this follows from 
the allegation. The stations, even if they refused to air the ads in response to the resolution, may 
have done so because they came to see the problems caused by the ads or did so out of public 
concern. However, in the view of all three judges, the refusal by the television stations had to be 
the result of a perceived threat to raise a constitutional issue. 
256. In another case involving very critical speech, Suarez Corp. Industries v. McGraw, 202 
F.3d 676 (4th Cir. 2000), the members of the Attorney General's Office in the State of West 
Virginia accused the plaintiff of "cheating West Virginia residents out of their money." Id. at 681. 
The plaintiff was every bit as active in the press, taking out ads accusing the Attorney General of 
playing politics and wasting the State's money and time. Id. The Attorney General, in discussions 
with the Better Business Bureau ("BBB"), also indicated an unwillingness to assist the BBB in 
expansion, if Suarez remained a member. Id. at 682. The court said, "where a public official's 
alleged retaliation is in the nature of speech, in the absence of a threat, coercion, or intimidation 
intimating that punishment, sanction, or adverse regulatory action will imminently follow, such 
speech does not adversely affect a citizen's First Amendment rights, even if defamatory." Id. at 
687. Finding no such threat or coercion, the court held that there was no violation of Suarez's 
rights. /d. at 689. 
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the well-being of youth. The holdings of various courts that the evidence is not 
yet strong enough to support the state's position under a strict scrutiny test does 
not mean that such a statement on a web site would itself be a constitutional 
violation. It could, of course, constitute libel, if the industry could bear the 
burden of proving its falsity. 
The next case considered in this portion of the analysis, as a part of looking 
at the Second Circuit's decisions in this area, may well be the most relevant to the 
suggestions in this Article. That relevance comes from the fact that the case, 
Hammerhead Enterprises, Inc. v. Brezenoff,257 also concerns a game. 
Hammerhead Enterprises produced the game Public Assistance-Why Bother 
Working for a Living ?258 It was a game in the style of Monopoly in which players 
moved around a board twelve times, once for each month of the year.259 There 
were two routes to be taken in trying to accumulate the most money. 260 On the 
inside route, the "Able Bodied Welfare Recipient's Promenade," money was 
more easily accumulated, especially if the player landed on the "have an 
illegitimate child" square.261 On the outside track, the "working person's rut," 
players faced obstacles in the nature of oppressive taxes, excessive regulation, 
and reverse discrimination.262 
The game's developers sought publicity for their offering, appearing on The 
Today Show and The Phil Donahue Show.263 The attempt at publicity also 
brought negative reaction, with the National Association of Women condemning 
the game and the Maryland NAACP's call for a boycott of stores carrying the 
game.264 The criticism that led to the court action was from New York City's 
Administrator of the Human Resources Administration.265 The Administrator, 
believing the game to be a distortion of the nature of the welfare system, saw it 
as his duty to express his disagreement with the view presented.266 He did so by 
writing to thirteen department stores in the city, urging them not to carry the 
game.267 The letter said that the game "'does a grave injustice to taxpayers and 
welfare clients alike'" and closed with: '''Your cooperation in keeping this game 
off the shelves of your stores would be a genuine public service. ",268 
Two stores responded, both indicating that they had already decided not to 
stock the game.269 The Administrator took no further action following up on the 
257. 707 F.2d 33 (2d Cir. 1983). 
258. [d. at 34. 
259. [d. at 34-35. 
260. [d. at 35. 
261. [d. 
262. [d. 
263. [d. at 36. 
264. [d. 
265. [d. at 36-37. 
266. [d. at 36. 
267. [d. 
268. [d. at 37. 
269. [d. 
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other letters, did not investigate stores that were carrying the game,270 and as the 
court noted, his department had no regulatory power over the merchants, and the 
Administrator did not contact any department that did have such power.271 The 
court also noted that "no credible evidence suggests that any store decided not to 
carry the game as a result of Brezenoff' s letter.'0272 
Turning to the consideration of the First Amendment claim, the court found 
no violation,273 only the Administrator's "well-reasoned and sincere entreaty in 
support of his own political perspective" that the game should not be carried by 
the stores.274 The court explained: 
The record before us, however, shows this claim to be little more than a 
figment of appellants' collective imagination .... Where comments of a 
government official can reasonably be interpreted as intimating that some 
fonn of punishment or adverse regulatory action will follow the failure 
to accede to the official's request, a valid claim can be stated. Similarly, 
claimants who can demonstrate that the distribution of items containing 
protected speech has been deterred by official pronouncements might 
raise cognizable First Amendment issues. We have already noted, 
however, appellants cannot establish that this case involves either of 
these troubling situations.275 
The court distinguished Bantam Books by once again noting the lack of power to 
impose sanctions and the lack of influence over the decision of any store.276 
The question left by this opinion is what the result would have been if any 
department stores had decided not to carry the game because of the 
Administrator's letter. If the stores had taken such action, given the content of 
the letter and the lack of regulatory authority in the department, there still would 
not have been an intimation of punishment or regulatory action, the first factor 
mentioned in the last quoted language. There would, however, have been an 
270. An investigation may constitute a violation of the First Amendment. In White v. Lee, 227 
F.3d 1214 (9th Cir. 2000), the San Francisco office ofthe U.S. Department of Housing and Urban 
Development ("HUD") conducted an investigation of three neighbors to a potential multi-family 
housing unit. The neighbors were concerned over the potential residents and conducted a political 
campaign against the project, and the HUD office investigated the campaign as an instance of 
housing discrimination. /d. at 1220-26. The Washington office of HUD eventually recognized that 
the neighbors had done nothing more than exercise their First Amendment rights, id., and the Ninth 
Circuit allowed the neighbors' suit for violation of their rights to proceed. Id. at 1240-41. 
271. Hammerhead Enter., Inc., 707 F.2d at 37. 
272. Id. 
273. Id. at 38. 
274. Id. 
275. Id. at 39 (citation omitted). 
276. Id. The plaintiffs had also suggested that the Administrator's efforts were 
unconstitutional because of their secret nature. Id. The court's response was to note that "[t]he 
First Amendment does not require [that] public officials to communicate only through the media." 
Id. 
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effect on distribution that might be said to be the result of official deterrence, the 
second factor. Which factor would control? 
The result might be divined from the difference between the use of "a valid 
claim can be stated," with regard to the first factor, and "might raise a cognizable 
First Amendment issue[]," with regard to the second factor. 277 That is, a 
government speaker threatening punishment or regulatory action is sufficient to 
constitute a violation of the First Amendment. On the other hand, if the basis for 
the claim is the effect of the government's speech, that may be sufficient to raise 
such a claim. At least the plaintiff should have the opportunity to show that the 
negative distribution decision was motivated by some sense of threat arising from 
the government speech. Such an opportunity for the plaintiff would put the 
Second Circuit in line with the Ninth Circuit's American Family Ass'n decision 
and mean that it is not the effectiveness, in itself, of the government speech that 
makes a difference. If it is effective because it provides a convincing argument 
or raises social values with which the hearers agree, similar to the effect that 
speech by a private citizen might have, that is not a violation. If it is effective 
because it is from the government and implies the imposition of some form of 
official sanction, that is a violation of the First Amendment. 
This view may be reinforced by a later Second Circuit case, Rattner v. 
Netbum.278 In that case, Rattner, a local businessman, had been very critical of 
the Village of Pleasantville, New York.279 He regularly litigated zoning disputes 
against the Village and claimed that the Village selectively enforced laws against 
him and otherwise harassed him.280 Rattner was a member of the local Chamber 
of Commerce and used the Chamber's newspaper to express his views.281 He 
placed an ad, formatted as an interview with him, in the paper criticizing the 
expenses incurred by the village in the litigation he filed. 282 In the same issue, on 
the front page, the Chamber published an article containing the results of a 
questionnaire indicating public dissatisfaction over the expenditures.283 
In response, Netburn, a village trustee, and others involved in village 
government offered their own criticism of Rattner.284 Netburn wrote the directors 
of the Chamber, other than Rattner, saying that the Chamber appeared to have 
"crossed the line between being a supportive, nonpartisan, and nonpolitical local 
organization to one that has a political agenda and purpose.,,285 He also asked the 
directors whether the entire membership had supported the decision to run the 
article, for a list of those supporting the decision, whether the Chamber had a 
political purpose and, if so, what it was, and whether members were using their 
277. [d. 
278. 930 F.2d 204 (2d Cir. 1991). 
279. !d. at 205-06. 
280. [d. at 205. 
281. [d. at 205-06. 
282. [d. at 205. 
283. [d. 
284. [d. 
285. [d. at 206. 
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Chamber offices to support political activity.286 The letter finished with: "I 
believe-and many of my neighbors believe-that the recent [issue of the paper] 
raises significant questions and concerns about the objectivity and trust which we 
are looking for from our business friends. I would appreciate a reply at your 
earliest convenience.,,287 In response, the Chamber stopped publishing its paper, 
after one last scheduled issue, and it prevented Rattner from publishing anything 
in that last issue.288 Rattner filed suit claiming a violation of his First Amendment 
rights in forcing the paper to cease publishing.289 The district court granted 
summary judgment for the defendants, holding that Rattner had not shown any 
violation of his constitutional rightS.29O 
Since the appeal was from a grant of summary judgment, the appellate court 
had to take all the plaintiffs allegations as true.291 Among those allegations was 
one, supported by depositions of the directors of the Chamber, stating that they 
took Netburn' s letter and other statements as threats of boycotts or of retaliatory 
action by the village.292 The court held that summary judgment was improper.293 
"[T]he record, taken in the light most favorable to Rattner, reveals statements by 
Netburn that a reasonable factfinder could, in the words of Hammerhead, 
'interpet[] as intimating that some form of punishment or adverse regulatory 
action w[ould] follow' if the [paper] continued to air Rattner's views.,,294 
Although the district court relied on Hammerhead, the Second Circuit 
distinguished the cases. 
[T]he district court in Hammerhead found that the Brezenoff letter had 
no coercive impact, and we noted that "not a single store was influenced 
by Brezenoffs correspondence." Here, in contrast, a threat was 
perceived and its impact was demonstrable. Several Chamber directors 
testified at their depositions that they viewed the letter as reminiscent of 
286. [d. 
287. [d. 
288. [d. at 206-07. 
289. [d. at 207. Compare Rossignol v. Voorhaar, 316 F.3d 516 (4th Cir. 2003) (raising the 
issue of buying out as much of the run of a particular issue as possible rather than shutting down 
the operation of a paper). Sheriffs deputies went from store to store and newspaper box to 
newspaper box buying all the available copies of the election day edition of the local newspaper. 
[d. at 520. The paper contained articles critical of the sheriff and a candidate the sheriff supported 
for state's attorney. [d. The court found a violation ofthe First Amendment because some of the 
store clerks recognized the off-duty and out-of-uniform purchasers as deputies. [d. at 526. At least 
one clerk claimed to have been intimidated. [d. The operation was held to be a constitutional 
violation because the newspaper's expression was suppressed in reaction to its criticism of 
government actors, and those actors used their government status in the purchases. /d. at 526-27. 
290. Netbum, 930 F.2d at 207. 
291. [d. at 209. 
292. [d. at 209-10. 
293. /d. at 210. 
294. [d. at 209. 
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McCarthyism, threatening them with boycott or discriminatory 
enforcement of Village regulations .... [T]he Chamber member who 
had been "in charge of' the [paper] testified ... he had actually lost 
business and had been harassed by the Village.295 
95 
The court found summary judgment improper because the above statements 
raised genuine issues of fact.296 
The question again arises whether effect is sufficient or whether there must 
be a threat of negative official action of some sort. The court points to both as 
alleged; that is, there was a claim of perceived threat, and there was an effect.297 
Is the threat necessary, or will the effect suffice? Here, the case was remanded 
for further proceedings because "there are genuine issues of fact to be tried. ,,298 
If effect was sufficient, there would be no real issue of fact to be tried. It was 
undisputed that, after Netburn's letter, the paper ceased publication and avoided 
any material from Rattner in its last issue scheduled. What remained unclear was 
the nature of Netburn's comments: Could they be taken as a threat of some 
retaliatory official action? That governmental coercion remains the hallmark of 
any violation of the First Amendment to be found in government speech seems 
clear. 
That is not the end of the Second Circuit's analysis of this field. Eight years 
later the issue arose again in X-Men Security, Inc. v. Pataki.299 X-Men Security 
had been providing security at Ocean Towers, a privately owned housing 
complex that received financial support from the federal and state government.3OO 
Ocean Towers had been quite dangerous, but when X-Men received the contract 
for security, safety improved rapidly.3ot A majority of the employees of X-Men 
were adherents of the Nation of Islam, the religious organization with which 
Louis Farrakan is affiliated.302 A state legislator and U.S. Congressman criticized 
the award of the contract to X-Men because of their perceptions of the teachings 
of the Nation of Islam.303 When the contract period expired Ocean Towers did 
not renew the contract with X-Men. X-Men brought a legal action claiming that 
the failure to renew was the result of racially and religiously biased statements by 
the legislators.304 
The court refused to find the legislators liable.305 The court noted that the 
legislators did not make the decision, did not have authority to supervise the 
295. [d. at 210 (citations omitted). 
296. [d. 
297. [d. 
298. [d. 
299. 196 F.3d 56 (2d Cir. 1999). 
300. [d. at 60. 
301. [d. at 61. 
302. [d. at 60. 
303. [d. at 61-62. 
304. [d. at 62. 
305. [d. at 72. 
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contracting process, and had no control over awarding or renewing the contract. 306 
Although the legislators made accusations, asked for government investigations, 
questioned X-Men's eligibility, and advocated that the company not be retained, 
the court said: 
We are aware of no constitutional right on the part of plaintiffs to 
require legislators to refrain from such speech or advocacy. 
The First Amendment guarantees all persons freedom to express 
their views. . . 
One does not lose one's right to speak upon becoming a 
legislator .... 
. . . The manifest function of the First Amendment in a 
representative government requires that legislators be given the widest 
latitude to express their views on issues of policy.307 
The court could find no cases providing a right on the part of an individual to 
prevent a legislator from expressing his or her views.308 While the expression of 
views together with threats or coercion could be a violation of the First 
Amendment, critical speech, even by a government speaker, is protected. Here, 
the critical speech was coupled with an effect, so coercion, the necessary factor 
in finding a violation of the First Amendment, was missing.309 
306. !d. at 68. 
307. [d. at 69-70. 
308. [d. at 70. 
309. [d. at 71. In a more recent case, the Second Circuit made it clear that "a public-official 
defendant who threatens to employ coercive state power to stifle protected speech violates a 
plaintiff s First Amendment rights even if the public-official defendant lacks direct regulatory or 
decisionmaking authority over the plaintiff or a third party that facilitates the plaintiffs speech." 
Okwedy v. Molinari, 333 F.3d 339, 340-41 (2d Cir. 2003). The court held it error to have 
dismissed the plaintiffs' free speech claim where a jury could find that the official's statements to 
a third party could be construed as threats to use official power to retaliate against the owner of 
billboards on which plaintiffs' messages were posted unless the owner removed the signs. [d. at 
344. The court distinguished X-Men by noting that in X-Men there was no allegation of pressure 
other than disapproving speech with no allegations of threats to actual decisionmakers of any 
coercive or intimidating conduct. [d. at 343-44. 
In an older billboard case, the Third Circuit refused to find a violation of speech rights in a 
similar request to remove billboards. R.C. Maxwell Co. v. Borough of New Hope, 735 F.2d 85, 
86 (3d Cir. 1984). R.C. Maxwell Co. involved a historic town that had tried for several years to 
pass an ordinance barring billboards. [d. The Borough then made an informal request to the 
billboard owner that the billboards be removed. [d. The letter mentioned the proposed ordinance 
and the possibility of legal proceedings if the billboards remained. [d. The owner removed the 
billboards, and the entity that had been advertising on the billboards sued the Borough for violation 
of its First Amendment rights. !d. at 87. It was noted that the owner had plans to develop land in 
the Borough, and that while denying any quid pro quo, the owner did want to stay in the Borough's 
good graces. [d. The court, noting the owner's statements that it did not feel coerced or 
intimidated, found no violation. [d. at 87. 
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A web site listing stores selling games to children younger than the ratings 
for the game and malls with arcades allowing similar play would not contain the 
sort of threat or coercion required by the courts before a violation of the game 
makers', store owners', malls', or arcade operators' First Amendment rights may 
be found. The web site would be informative. If stores or malls decided that they 
did not like the information being disseminated and chose to change their sales 
policies or rental agreements, that would not violate game makers' expression 
rights. If the owners or operators did so, because they would have done so all 
along, but only now are aware of the problem, there is certainly no issue. If they 
change policies and practices because of concern over public reaction, that too is 
not a violation. The only potential violation from government speech, such as an 
informative web site, is if the speech contains threats or is otherwise coercive. 
There is no such threat or coercion to be found in the simple posting of 
information. 
C. Due Process Issues 
Assuming that the courts find no infringement of First Amendment rights in 
posting the results of violent video game stings on a web site, the second line of 
attack on the proposal is likely to be a claim that it violates due process. The 
program proposes simply to attempt purchases by underage buyers or attempt to 
play such games in arcades and then post the results. The suggested program 
does not include hearings or even notice to the merchant with a chance to 
respond. The increased costs and delays in providing such procedure might make 
the system too expensive to implement and the web notice could be significantly 
delayed. 
The basis for the due process claim would be that the merchants' reputations 
are affected by the stigma of being listed on the web site. Fortunately, for the 
proposed program, such stigmatization is usually not sufficient to invoke the Due 
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. That result was made clear by the 
Supreme Court in Paul v. Davis?1O Prior to that decision, however, it might have 
seemed that stigmatization was sufficient to invoke the Constitution's procedural 
guarantees. 
In the earlier case, Wisconsin v. Constantineau,311 the Court found 
unconstitutional a Wisconsin law that authorized, without notice and the 
opportunity to be heard, the posting of the names of persons determined to be 
The two cases might be distinguished by the fact that in the first the cause of concern was the 
message against homosexuals, while in the second the concern was over the billboards generally. 
In the second case, however, there was also a concern expressed that the ads on the billboard had 
nothing to do with the historic town and advertised businesses outside the community. [d. at 86. 
It was the lack of coercion in the second case that made the difference. [d. at 87. The court refused 
to find private actions that conform to civic sentiment to be coerci ve for purposes of finding a First 
Amendment violation. [d. at 89. 
310. 424 U.S. 693, 712 (1976). 
311. 400 U.S. 433 (1971). 
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hazardous to themselves, their families, or the community due to excessive 
drinking.312 Those whose names were posted could not buy liquor or receive it 
as a gift, with criminal penalties possible against the seller or donor.313 There was 
language in that opinion indicating that the injury to reputation caused by posting 
the name required the safeguards of due process. For example, the Court stated 
that "[w]here a person's good name, reputation, honor, or integrity is at stake 
because of what the government is doing to him, notice and an opportunity to be 
heard are essential.,,314 
Paul v. Davis, at fIrst blush, seems similar to Constantineau. In Paul v. 
Davis, law enforcement authorities in Kentucky sent to some 800 local merchants 
a flyer with the names and photos of active shoplifters.315 Davis was included on 
the list, with his photo, on the basis of a shoplifting arrest and a charge that was 
later dismissed.316 Davis felt that he had been stigmatized and argued that doing 
so without adjudicating the charge was a violation of due process.317 The Court 
denied the claim and held that injury to reputation alone is never sufficient to 
invoke the Constitution's procedural protections.3J8 The Court distinguished 
Constantineau by noting that the individual in that case also lost a right protected 
by state law, the right of adults to purchase or be given a1cohol.319 In Paul v. 
Davis, there was no accompanying loss, only the damage to reputation. That 
damage was normally the subject of a defamation action under state law, and the 
plaintiff was to be left to that remedy. 
In Block v. Meese,320 the District of Columbia Circuit recognized this rule 
when considering the propaganda label put on the fIlms from the National Film 
Board of Canada.32J The court said that the word "propaganda" was not 
312. [d. at 436-39. 
313. [d. at 439 n.2. 
314. [d. at 437. The Court also referred to reputation in other cases. [d. (citing Wisconsin v. 
Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433 (1971); Peters v. Hobby, 349 U.S. 331 (1955) (Douglas, J., 
concurring); Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183 (1952); Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. 
McGrath, 341 U.S. 123 (1951); United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303 (1946». InBoard of Regents 
v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 573-75 (1972), the Court refused to find a right to due process in the failure 
to rehire a teacher on a one year contract. The Court noted that 
[t]he State, in declining to rehire the respondent, did not make any charge against him 
that might seriously damage his standing and associations in his community . 
. . . Similarly, there is no suggestion that the State, in declining to re-employ the 
respondent, imposed on him a stigma or other disability that foreclosed his freedom to 
take advantage of other employment opportunities. 
[d. at 573. 
315. Paul, 424 U.S. at 699-95. 
316. [d. at 695-96. 
317. [d. at 697-98. 
318. /d. at 706. 
319. [d. at 708-09. 
320. 793 F.2d 1303 (D.C. Cir. 1986). 
321. [d. at 1314. 
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necessarily stigmatizing, but instead had a neutral reading.322 The court went on, 
however, to say that even if "propaganda" were stigmatizing, "'stigmatization' 
alone, 'divorced from ... effect on the legal status of an organization or person, 
such as the loss of a tax exemption or loss of government employment,' does not 
constitute a deprivation of liberty for due process purposes."m 
Doe v. Department of Public Safety ex reI. Lee,324 a particularly enlightening 
case on this issue also involving a web based list, was a challenge to 
Connecticut's sex offender list. Under Connecticut law, those convicted of 
certain offenses were required to register with the state annually, provide any 
changes of address, provide DNA and fingerprints, and submit to having his 
photo taken at least once every five years.325 The names and addresses of 
registrants were placed on a web site searchable by zip code or town name.326 
Doe had been convicted of a crime that came within the scope of the statute and 
was required to register, but he claimed that he was not a dangerous sexual 
offender and posed no threat.327 Since his name's presence on the list would 
indicate dangerousness, Doe argued that he had a due process right to contest in 
some manner his individual dangerousness.328 The court recognized the validity 
of his claim, and in doing so, the court explained the requirements of due process 
in this area. 329 
The court in Doe explained the requirements that result from Paul v. Davis. 
A plaintiff complaining of defamation by the government must show 
(1) the utterance of a statement about him or her that is sufficiently 
derogatory to injure his or her reputation, that is capable of being proved 
false, and that he or she claims is false, and (2) some tangible and 
material state-imposed burden or alteration of his or her status or of a 
right in addition to the stigmatizing statement. 330 
The test was characterized as a "stigma plus" test; that is, not only must there be 
stigma, there must also be some other IOSS.331 
Oddly, the court devoted some time to whether or not the plaintiff had been 
stigmatized, a seemingly easy question.332 This is best explained by the existence 
of a disclaimer on the web site that the list included both dangerous and 
nondangerous offenders, but the court determined that the inference likely to be 
drawn from the list is that those listed are more likely to be dangerous than those 
322. [d. at 1311-12. 
323. /d. at 1314 (quoting Paul, 424 U.S. at 705). 
324. 271 F.3d 38 (2d Cir. 2001), rev'd, 538 U.S. 1 (2003). 
325. [d. at 42-44. 
326. [d. at 44. 
327. [d. at 45. 
328. [d. at 45-46. 
329. [d. at 47. 
330. /d. 
331. [d. 
332. [d. at 47-50. 
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in the general population.333 
Turning to the "plus" factor, the court fIrst noted that the additional burden 
must be independent of the alleged defamation. 
Most defamation plaintiffs attempt to show some sort of special damage 
and out-of-pocket loss which flows from the injury to their reputation. 
But so long as such damage flows from injury caused by the defendant 
to a plaintiff s reputation, it may be recoverable under state tort law but 
it is not recoverable in a [constitutional] action.334 
The imposition of the plaintiffs additional burden must be "governmental in 
nature" in order to distinguish the case from the ordinary defamation action.335 
In Doe, the registration requirements constituted an adequate "plus" factor 
because they altered the legal status of the plaintiff and were governmental in 
nature since they could not be imposed by a private actor.336 Therefore, the 
plaintiff was due a hearing before being placed on the list. 337 While the Supreme 
Court reversed the holding that a hearing was required, it did not contradict the 
"stigma plus" analysis. Instead, the Court noted that the statute did not require 
dangerousness, so a hearing was not relevant to placement on the list. It would 
be a "bootless exercise.'>33S 
The web site list proposed here would not impose anything approaching the 
degree of stigmatization present in Doe, especially if the site notes that it is not 
illegal for the stores to sell the games to those below the rated age or for arcades 
to allow similar play. Even more important, there is no "plus" factor. There is 
no imposition of a burden that is governmental in nature. There is no burden in 
the sense that no legal rights are altered. Whatever effect on legal rights may 
result from the posted web list is not uniquely governmental in its genesis. 
Although only a government actor could have required Doe to register with the 
State of Connecticut, anyone may run the same sort of sting suggested and post 
the results on a web site. 
Any resulting injury to the stores or arcades listed is the sort of injury that, 
if the statements were false, would be the proper subject of a state law defamation 
action. The stigma, if there is any, is pure defamation. Any burden on business 
from consumers who may choose not to shop at stores that sell violent video 
games to those younger than the games' ratings or who choose not to frequent 
malls with arcades allowing such play is exactly the same sort of burden that 
would grow out of statements by private individuals. If a store, arcade, or mall 
wishes to contest its inclusion on the list, the defamation suit is the proper route; 
however, if the compilation is accurate, that route will be of no avail. 
With regard to any defamation suit, it is important to note that the X-Men 
333. [d. at 49. 
334. [d. at 54 (quoting Siegert v. Gilley, 500 U.S. 226,234 (1991). 
335. [d. at 56. 
336. [d. at 56-57. 
337. [d. at 57-60. 
338. Conn. Dep't of Pub. Safety v. Doe, 538 U.S. 1,8 (2003). 
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court addressed the standard to be applied and held that the New York Times 
actual malice standard must be met.339 As the Court in New York Times 
recognized, an uninhibited, robust, and open debate requires the breathing space, 
and the New York Times standard affords even erroneous statements.34O The court 
in X-Men saw no reason not to extend this protection to statements by 
government officials, saying "[t]he interest of the public in hearing all sides of a 
public issue is hardly advanced by extending more protection to citizen-critics 
than to legislators.,,341 
IV. LESSONS FROM THE CASES 
A. Content o/the Web Site 
It is clear from the cases that a governmental entity may constitutionally 
maintain the proposed web site listing stores and arcades, or the malls containing 
them, that make violent video games rated beyond the age of the children 
available to children. The most important aspect of the web site, other than the 
information on child access, is carefully to avoid any threat, explicit or implied, 
of state coercion. That is, there can be no hint of the imposition of governmental 
sanction. While there is likely to be, and indeed the aim of the list is to bring 
about, public pressure, that is a far cry from government sanction. The list 
provides information that individuals may use to focus their concerns over 
children and violent video games. It is not a list of merchants who may be 
brought into court on any sort of charges to face criminal or civil sanction. 
To assure that there is no perceived threat of governmental sanction, the site 
should make it clear that it is legal to allow children access to the games in 
question. That statement of legality may, however, be accompanied by a variety 
of other statements. Among those statements should probably be a recount of the 
video games industry's ESRB rating system, noting that the ratings are not legally 
enforceable, and that the stores, arcades, and malls on the list are allowing 
children access to games the industry itself says are inappropriate. 
The web site should also contain a summary of the research on the effects of 
violent video games on children, perhaps with links to further resources on the 
issue. It is true that the research has thus far not been sufficient to meet the strict 
scrutiny test necessary to justify legal restrictions on access by minors, but that 
does not mean the research is in any sense false. Even if the research were to tum 
out to be false, this is a matter of great public concern, and as long as the 
governmental unit does not know the material posted is false or have reckless 
disregard for its falsity, the statements are protected from any recovery for 
339. X-Men Sec., Inc. v. Pataki, 196 F.3d 56, 69-70 (2d Cir. 1999) (citing New York Times 
Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 271-72 (1964) (requiring that public official plaintiffs in a libel suit 
demonstrate actual malice on the part of the defendants, meaning that the defendants knew the 
statements made were false or had a reckless disregard for truth or falsity)). 
340. New York Times, 376 U.S. at 271-72. 
341. X-Men Sec., Inc., 196 F.3d at 70 (quoting Bond v. Floyd, 385 U.S. 116, 135-36 (1966)). 
HeinOnline -- 41 Ind. L. Rev. 102 2008
102 INDIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 41:55 
libel.342 Nor is there any need for an exaggerated sense of fairness to the other 
side of the debate.343 Not only is the health and psychological community rather 
united in its position on the issue; it is clear that a governmental entity may state 
its own position on an issue without providing a vehicle for presentation of 
alternative views as long as it employs a communication channel that is restricted 
solely to government use rather than a public forum. 344 
The government may state its belief based on scientific research that playing 
these games is harmful to children. Such a message would be similar to public 
health messages that the government conveys in a variety of contexts, such as the 
effects of high fat or high sugar foods on children or lack of exercise and sleep. 
Again, the government must be careful to avoid any perceived threat to parents. 
Not only do parents have a constitutional right to determine the material to which 
their children are exposed, at least in certain contexts,345 any threat to parents 
resulting in pressure on stores, arcades, and malls could be construed as 
governmental pressure and a potential violation of the First Amendment rights of 
the providers. That is, although the government may constitutionally provide 
information from which parents and others may select the targets for their 
concerns over children and violent video games, any state coercion behind the 
public pressure can be a constitutional problem. 
B. Concerns Over a "Ratings Creep" 
There are already those who are unhappy with the industry ratings and 
believe that some teen rated games should be rated for mature players.346 The use 
of ratings suggested here may lead to a "ratings creep" in which games that 
formerly would have been rated M would be rated T, allowing the games to be 
bought or played without the retailer or arcade operator being placed on the 
offender list. Alternatively, the ESRB could simply go out of business. The 
ESRB could take the position that it provided ratings as a tool for parents, but if 
government is going to use the ratings to bring public pressure against those who 
provide the games to children, it would simply prefer not to provide the 
government the standard to be used. 
In this regard, it is important to note that there is nothing in the case law 
examined, or in the analyses of those cases, requiring that the industry's own 
rating system provide the basis for inclusion on the web site list. A third party 
system or even a government rating could instead be used. A public interest 
342. See supra notes 339-41 and accompanying text. 
343. See, e.g., supra notes 44-51,55 and accompanying text. 
344. See Kidwell v. City of Union, 462 F.3d 620, 624 (6th CiT. 2006) (finding no First 
Amendment violation in City'S expenditure of funds to oppose citizen initiative), cert. den.ied, 127 
S. Ct. 2258 (2007). 
345. See, e.g., Pierce v. Soc'y of the Sisters of the Holy Names of Jesus and Mary, 268 U.S. 
510,534-35 (1925) (recognizing "liberty of parents and guardians to direct the upbringing and 
education of children") (citing Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923»). 
346. See supra notes 112-14 and accompanying text. 
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group could enlist psychologists to rate games. The government could not 
require that publishers submit the games prior to their release, but there is no 
prohibition against any entity, government or private, buying the game, playing 
it, and providing its own rating as to suitability for various ages. 
To be fair to retailers, arcades, and mall operators, it should be clear to all 
what ages are seen as proper for each game under any nonindustry rating system. 
The best solution may be to invite the publishers of games rated as appropriate 
for a particular age to display the rating symbol of the group doing the rating. 
The public could then be informed when a retailer or arcade operator made 
available to children games rated by the alternative system as inappropriate for 
the children's ages. The effect would place the same public pressure on game 
producers to submit their games by the nonindustry evaluators for rating; but 
again, rating would not be legally mandated, and public pressure would not 
constitute a constitutional violation. 
Presumably, the industry would prefer to maintain control of the rating 
system. Although the industry or a still existent ESRB might choose to stretch 
the categories, it would likely not want to do so to the point of breaking. If 
industry did stretch or abandon the system, the sting and web site list approach 
advocated here can continue to operate without the industry's cooperation. 
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